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Civil RICO Reform: The Basis
for Compromise
Michael Goldsmith*
The leading financial law firms who have been systematically carry-
ing on a campaign against this Act have been seeking-now that they
and their financial clients have come out of their storm cellar of
fear-not to improve but to chloroform the Act They evidently as-
sume that the public is unaware of the sources of the issues that repre-
sent the baldest abuses of fiduciary responsibility and of the lawyers
who, to their fat profit '"passed" on these issues.1
In the half-century since Felix Frankfurter criticized Wall
Street's response to New Deal securities legislation, govern-
ment protection of commercial markets has become an estab-
lished aspect of modern society.2 Antitrust and securities laws
today are viewed as essential to maintaining free competition
and marketplace integrity.3 Few recall, however, that such
* Associate Professor of Law, Brigham Young University. The author is
grateful to Don Fletcher, Jim Retallick, and Vicki Rinne, for their research
assistance and valuable support in the development of this Article, and to Gary
Hill, without whose assistance the project would not have been successfully
completed.
1. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Henry Stimson (Dec. 19, 1933), re-
printed in J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 79 (1982).
2. J. SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 79.
3. For example, the Supreme Court has endorsed antitrust legislation in
glowing terms: "Antitrust laws in general and the Sherman Act in particular,
are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preser-
vation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of
Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms." United
States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). See also J. BURNS, A
STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST LAws 9-10 (1958) ("Ihe antitrust laws have been
the distinctive American answer to the possibilities for abuse inherent in a sys-
tem of free enterprise.... [The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890] has become
one of the fundamental elements of the American capitalistic system.").
Laws regulating securities transactions are equally fundamental. See
HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SEC
at XLV (Comm. Print 1977) (asserting that maintenance of public confidence
in the integrity of securities markets requires "significant involvement of the
federal government in establishing rules of disclosure and in the enforcement
of them"); 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 8 (2d ed. 1961) (The proscription
of fraud is "the basic foundation of any system of investor protection."); cf Co-
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measures were initially opposed by the business community.4
More recently, civil RICO, another attempt to promote
commercial integrity, has evoked institutional criticism and has
been targeted for reform.5 Enacted as part of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970,6 the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations statute (RICO) was intended to provide en-
hanced criminal sanctions and novel civil remedies in order to
attack organized crime.7 RICO's civil provisions were specifi-
cally designed to deter enterprise criminality by authorizing
treble damage awards and attorneys fees for successful plain-
tiffs.8 Civil RICO has engendered controversy, however, be-
hen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1340, 1344 (1966) (not-
ing that the Securities Act of 1933 "produces disclosures of amazing quantity
and quality in the specific areas where its requirements apply"). See generally
T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 3-8 (1985) (summarizing scope
and coverage of pertinent legislation).
4. For example, securities legislation was attacked by corporate leaders
as part of an overall effort to undermine the New Deal. See A. SCHLESINGER,
THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 457 (1959)
("[B]usiness leaders condemned the [1934] bill in steady procession before
[Congress].... [The attack was along familiar lines: regulation of the ex-
changes was unnecessary, impractical, and dangerous; its only effect would be
to deter investment."); J. SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 77-79. Similarly, strong
antitrust measures were opposed by large business interests. See T. COCHRAN
& W. MILLER, THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE 171-72 (rev. ed. 1960) (suggesting that
business perceived the Sherman Act as an empty gesture and attempted to
have it repealed once its effect was understood); M. FAINSOD, L. GORDON & J.
PALAMOUNTAIN, JR., GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 447-50 (3d
ed. 1959) (noting influence of "big business" within Republican party and lack
of early enforcement); cf. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law
1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 221, 221 (1955) (stating that some maintained that
Sherman Act was a fraud because Congress was dominated by "'many of the
... industrial magnates most vulnerable to real antitrust legislation'" (quoting
M. FAINSOD & L. GORDON, GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 450
(1941)). See generally Cohen, Civil RICO Under Fire: Will White Collar
Criminals Be Exempted, 4 ANTIOCH L.J. 153, 170-71 (1986).
5. Cohen, supra note 4, at 168. Civil RICO has become a target for re-
form despite its widespread use by leading commercial enterprises. A sample
listing of major corporations that have used RICO is contained in Oversight on
Civil RICO Suits: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 411 (1986) [hereinafter Senate RICO Hearings] (statement of the Nat'l
Ass'n of Att'ys Gen. and Nat'l Dist. Att'ys Ass'n). Of particular note is a civil
RICO suit by IBM that resulted in a multimillion-dollar settlement. Id
6. Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 901-902, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48 (1970) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
7. The Statement of Findings and Purpose of the Organized Crime Con-
trol Act of 1970 states, in pertinent part, that "[it is the purpose of this Act to
seek the eradication of organized crime . . . by providing enhanced sanctions
and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in or-
ganized crime." Id. at 922-23.
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
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cause it has principally been applied against white collarinstitutions rather than against traditional organized crime.9The Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. ImrexCo.'0 sustained this application of civil RICO, but refrainedfrom conferring complete legitimacy. Instead, Justice White's
opinion, emphasizing the statute's breadth, expressly signaledto Congress that only legislative reform could modify RICO's
scope."1
Since Sedima, numerous reform bills have been ad-
vanced.12  Most stemmed from concerns that RICO suits
against legitimate businesses both distorted the congressionalintent underlying the statute and afforded undue opportunityfor malicious prosecution.13 Unfortunately, however, these billsgenerally have failed to provide tailored solutions to specificRICO problems. Instead, under the guise of reform, most haveproposed amendments that would inevitably have emasculated
9. Senate RICO Hearings, supra note 5, at 2-4 (statements of SenatorsThurmond, Denton, McConnell, and Simon). See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. ImrexCo., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3287 (1985) (noting that actions under RICO are aimed "al-most solely" against respected business, "rather than against the archetypal,intimidating mobster"); see also id. at 3295 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (positingthat Court's reading of the civil RICO provision as applying to "legitimatebusinesses" has caused "dislocations" of congressional purpose); id. at 3288(Powell, J., dissenting) ("I write separately to emphasize my disagreementwith the Court's conclusion that the statute must be applied to authorize thetypes of private civil actions now being brought frequently against respected
businesses.").
10. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
11. Justice White concluded:
"[T]he fact that RICO has been applied in situations not expressly an-ticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demon-
strates breadth."...
It is true that private civil actions under the statute are beingbrought almost solely against [respected businesses], rather thanagainst the archetypal, intimidating mobster. Yet this defect-if de-fect it is-is inherent in the statute as written, and its correction must
lie with Congress.Id. at 3287 (footnote omitted) (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank &Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984), affd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606(1985)).
12. Reform bills considered by the 99th Congress are set forth in the
Appendix.
13. Senator Orrin Hatch, for example, remarked in introducing S. 1521into Congress that "[RICO's] authors did not want or intend RICO to be usedto harass legitimate businesses.... The avowed purpose of RICO was to de-crease the incidence of, and act as a deterrent to, organized crime.... In thecontext of civil RICO ... the restraining influence of prosecutors is completelyabsent." 131 CONG. REC. S10,285-87 (daily ed. July 29, 1985). See also Lacovara& Aronow, The Legal Shakedown of Legitimate Business People: The Run-away Provision of Private Civil RICO, 21 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1985-1986).
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the private civil RICO action.
14
Because civil RICO is potentially an invaluable antifraud
mechanism,15 any reform attempt should be limited to demon-
strated problems caused by the law.
16 This Article proposes
such a reform program. Part I reviews the merits of civil
RICO. Part II next evaluates the need for reform. Part III
then critiques those reform proposals that would emasculate
the statute. Finally, Part IV proposes a nine-point reform plan.
The proposed plan is intended to provide Congress with a new
basis for compromise of the present legislative debate.
I. THE MERITS OF CIVIL RICO
RICO prohibits three categories of activity specified in sec-
tion 1962 of title 18: the investment of racketeering proceeds in
an interstate enterprise (section 1962(a)); 17 the acquisition or
maintenance of an interest in an interstate enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity (section 1962(b));'
8 and the con-
ducting of interstate enterprise affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity (section 1962(c)).' 9 "Racketeering activ-
14. See infra notes 89-148 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 31 & 73-76 and accompanying text.
16. Moreover, Congress must not merely identify alleged problem areas.
It is also necessary to examine the merits of anti-RICO arguments. For 
exam-
ple, RICO abuse is purportedly a widespread phenomenon. 
Careful analysis,
however, has revealed that the abuse issue has been grossly misrepresented.
See Goldsmith & Keith, Civil RICO Abuse: The Allegations in Contex 
1986
B.Y.U. L. REv. 55, 68-71.
17. Section 1962(a) states in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income de-
rived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has par-
ticipated as a principal ... to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any
part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of
any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise
which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or for-
eign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982).
18. Section 1962(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or main-
tain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise
which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or for-
eign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982).
19. Section 1962(c) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly,
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ity" is determined by reference to specified predicate acts;20
"pattern" is minimally defined as "at least two acts of racke-
teering activity... within ten years."'2 1 Significantly, the term
"enterprise" is not limited to traditional organized crime
groups, but is broadly defined in neutral terms.2 2
Although principally concerned with the infiltration of le-
gitimate businesses by organized crime,23 Congress purposely
drafted RICO to address a wide variety of problems.24 Indeed,
if infiltration had been the exclusive legislative concern, the
third category, section 1962(c), would have been of limited util-
ity.25 Section 1962(c), however, has been the mainstay of crimi-
in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racket-
eering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982).
20. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp. III 1985).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
22. The term "'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corpora-
tion, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982).
23. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981) ("[L]egislative his-
tory forcefully supports the view that the major purpose of [RICO] is to ad-
dress the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime."). See Blakey
& Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic
Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TFP. L.Q. 1009, 1014-16 (1980)
(reviewing emphasis on infiltration problem).
24. See Turkette, 452 U.S. at 591-93 (noting that RICO was intended to be
both preventive and remedial). Senator McClellan, principal sponsor of RICO,
rejected the proposition that reform ought to be limited to traditional organ-
ized crime. See 116 CONG. REc. 18,913-14 (1970). He acknowledged that
problems occasioned by organized crime initially led to legislative inquiry, but
maintained that "Congress has the duty of enacting a principled solution to
the entire problem. Comprehensive solutions to identified problems must be
translated into well integrated legislative programs." Id. at 18,914. See also
Papa v. Cremosnik, 635 F. Supp. 1402, 1410-11 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (noting that
Congress decided to include commercial frauds); 116 CONG. REc. 35,204 (1970)
(statement of Rep. Poff indicating that "every effort was made to produce a
strong and effective tool with which to combat organized crime-an at the
same time deal fairly with all who might be affected by this legislation-
whether part of the crime syndicate or not"); infra note 157. Congress has
often enacted laws capable of flexible application in a variety of contexts. See
Goldsmith & Keith, supra note 16, at 73-74 & n.85 (explaining such use of
racketeering, antitrust, and civil rights laws). Thus, RICO is not unusual in
this respect.
25. Indeed, if infiltration were the sole legislative concern, § 1962(c) might
even be unnecessary. Sections 1962(a) and (b) would effectively handle most
infiltration problems. Section 1962(c) has an anti-infiltration purpose only in
the sense that it may be used to attack racketeering activity at its source,
thereby preventing racketeers from engaging in future infiltration activities.
See Turkette, 452 U.S. at 591-93 (citing legislative history indicating congres-
sional intent to strike at organized crime's "primary sources of revenue and
power," id. at 591).
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nal prosecution efforts against organized crime. Although
extremely successful, these criminal cases generally have not
involved charges of infiltration.26 Nor have they been limited
to Mafia prosecutions. A variety of white-collar criminal activi-
ties by so-called legitimate businesses has been prosecuted
under section 1962(c) as well.2 7 Given this record of criminal
enforcement, RICO's civil provisions may afford comparable
opportunities for actions against so-called legitimate businesses
engaged in ongoing criminal activity.
Most civil RICO suits also have alleged violations of section
1962(c). 28 For the most part, these suits have been aimed
at combating fraud;2 9 relatively few have involved traditional
organized crime groups.30 To suggest, however, that civil RICO
is therefore misdirected is to misconceive the nature and extent
of fraud in our society. The Department of Justice recently
26. Cf. Senate RICO Hearings, supra note 5, at 107-11 (statement of Ass't
Att'y Gen. Stephen S. Trott) (in commenting on the salutary effects of RICO,
noting numerous RICO cases not involving infiltration-oriented predicates).
See also Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Re-
lated Agencies Appropriations for 1983, Part 7 Hearings Before a Subcomm
of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1050-51 (1982)
(summarizing unprecedented success of RICO prosecutions of organized crime
families); Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Re-
lated Agencies Appropriations for 1982, Part 6: Hearings Before a Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 49-61 (1981)
(same).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Jannotti, 729 F.2d 213, 226-27 (3d Cir. 1984)
(lawyer involved in ABSCAM "front"); United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d
993, 994-95 (6th Cir. 1982) (governor of Tennessee's office as enterprise);
United States v. Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066, 1070, 1074-75 (5th Cir. 1981) (Florida's
Third Judicial Circuit as enterprise); United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611
F.2d 763, 769-70 (9th Cir. 1980) (corporation as enterprise). Today, such use of
criminal RICO is well accepted. At first, however, it too was controversial.
See Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM
L. REV. 165, 170, 176 (1980); Are Prosecutors Going Wild Over RICO, Legal
Times of Wash., Oct. 8, 1971, at 32, col. 1, cited in Blakey & Gettings, supra
note 23, at 1012 (quoting prominent Washington defense counsel William G.
Hundley: "But they're using this [RICO] against all kinds of defendants. You
know as well as I do that Congress never would have passed it if they ever
thought they were going to use it against governors and people like that.").
28. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING
AND BusiNEss LAW, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CiviL RICO TASK FORCE 57
(1985) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT] (estimating that 97% of cases allege
§ 1962(c) violations).
29. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3295 (1985) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (citing TASK FORCE REPORT statistics indicating 77% fraud
cases).
30. Id. See Senate RICO Hearings, supra note 5, app. at 267-70 (appendix
to statement of Ray J. Groves, Chairman, American Institute of Certified Pub-
lic Accountants) (summarizing statistics).
[Vol. 71:827
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reported that fraud accounts for losses exceeding $200 bil-
lion annually. 31  These losses represent a long-term
31. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AT-
TORNEY GENERAL 42 (1984). All studies agree that fraud poses a profound na-
tional problem. See, e.g., UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, A
HANDBOOK ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME: EVERYBODY'S PROBLEM, EVERYBODY'S
LOSS 6 (1974) (economic cost of fraud exceeds $41 billion per year); Cole, Cover
Letter to AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ECO-
NOMIC OFFENSES (1977) (noting federal estimates that fraud is a $40 billion
problem annually and likely to worsen). A detailed review of the impact of
fraud in a variety of areas was recently prepared by the Congressional Re-
search Service of the Library of Congress. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, AIRLINE TICKET FRAUD 1 (memorandum dated
April 1, 1986 by Rita Ann Reimer, Legislative Attorney, American Law Divi-
sion, noting losses of approximately $500 million each year); CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERv., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, ARSON FOR PROFIT: TECHNIQUES,
SCOPE AND IMPACT 1 (memorandum dated March 18, 1986 by Rita Ann
Reimer, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division, noting that arson fraud
"accounts for billions of dollars in property losses" each year); CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BANK FRAUD I (memorandum dated
April 21, 1986 by Raymond Natter, Legislative Attorney, American Law Divi-
sion, noting that "[blank fraud is often cited as the cause or contributing factor
in at least one-half of all bank failures in the country [but that] the true ex-
tent and nature of the problem is difficult to determine with accuracy"); CON-
GRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, DRUG FRAUD 1
(memorandum dated May 7, 1986 by Cathy Gilmore, Legislative Attorney,
American Law Division, noting estimates that "the cost of medical quackery
[exceeds] $10 billion per year"); CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, FRAUD BY INSURANCE COMPANIES 1-8 (memorandum dated April
11, 1986 by Henry Cohen, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division, sur-
veying types of insurance fraud); CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS, FRAUD IN DEFENSE PROCUREMENT 2 (memorandum dated May
15, 1986 by Jack H. Maskell, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division, cit-
ing estimates from $23 billion to $38 billion); CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV.,
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERN-
MENT 3-4 (memorandum dated April 28, 1986 by Rita Ann Reimer, Legislative
Attorney, American Law Division, noting estimates that 5% of total outlays of
nearly $72 billion may be fraudulent); CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LI-
BRARY OF CONGRESS, RECORD, TAPE AND FILM PIRACY AND COUNTERFEITING 1
(memorandum dated April 28, 1986 by Rita Ann Reimer, Legislative Attorney,
American Law Division, noting losses of "several billion dollars annually");
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, SECURITIES AND
COMMODITIES FRAUD I (memorandum dated April 17, 1986 by Michael V.
Seitzinger, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division, noting that "various
kinds of alleged securities and commodities fraud" have "in the opinion of
many defrauded Americans of tremendous sums of money"); CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, UPDATE OF CRS REPORT ENTITLED
'WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE PROBLEM AND THE FEDERAL RESPONSE" 2 (mem-
orandum dated April 10, 1986 from Suzanne Cavanagh and William Woldman,
Analysts in American National Government, Intergovernmental Relations
Section, Government Division, to Senator Joseph Biden, summarizing range of
estimates from $27 billion annually in the 1970s to $200 billion in 1984). See
also J. BOLOGNA, CORPORATE FRAUD 9 (1984) (noting a 1980 survey reporting
1987]
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trend32 that neither traditional criminal nor civil sanctions have
been able to reverse.33
Civil RICO potentially provides an effective way to combat
this fraud problem. Its treble damage and counsel fee provi-
sions encourage remedial litigation by private plaintiffs.34 Be-
cause complex fraud investigations often require resource
commitments that prosecutive agencies are unable to make,35
private attorneys general can serve a critical supplementary
function. Private treble damage actions also promote deter-
that 117 of America's largest corporations had been convicted of white-collar
crimes during the 1970s).
Because of the fraud problem, state and local law enforcement organiza-
tions have aggressively supported civil RICO. See, e.g., Senate RICO Hearings,
supra note 5, at 404, 408-09 (statement of the Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys Gen. and
Nat'l Dist. Att'ys Ass'n voicing support for RICO). For similar reasons, a re-
cent American Bar Association committee report endorsed the utility of fraud-
based RICO predicates. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SECTION, A COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVE ON CIVIL AND CRIMINAL RICO LEG-
ISLATION AND LITIGATION 40-47 (1985) [hereinafter RICO LEGISLATION AND
LITIGATION]. See also Cohen, supra note 4, at 171-73 (summarizing fraud
problem).
32. See authorities cited supra note 31.
33. See, e.g., Senate RICO Hearings, supra note 5, at 415-17 (statement of
the Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys Gen. and Nat'l Dist. Att'ys Ass'n) (noting inadequa-
cies of existing remedies); RICO LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION, supra note 31,
at 47 ("It can hardly be argued that current law has curtailed [fraud] ade-
quately."). See infra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
34. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3284 (1985) (noting
that both private attorney general provision and treble damages provision sup-
port a legislative purpose to encourage civil litigation); see also infra note 86.
35. For example, in 1970, one commentator observed:
The increasing complexity of our society heightens vulnerability
because it increases the difficulty of obtaining redress for losses suf-
fered. Legal services are costly, prosecutors and investigators are
overburdened, and court calendars are clogged.
... The prevention, deterrence, investigation, and prosecution of
white-collar crime must compete with other interests for allocation of
law enforcement dollars, in an atmosphere in which every other na-
tional problem is made more serious and more costly of solution by
the increasing complexities of our society.
H. EDELHERTZ, THE NATURE, IMPACT, AND PROSECUTION OF WHITE-COLLAR
CRIME 8 (1970) (emphasis added). Today, of course, federal prosecutors face
the unprecedented budgetary constraints of Gramm-Rudmann. See Senate
RICO Hearings, supra note 5, at 538 (statement of Philip A. Feigin, Ass't Se-
curities Comm'r, Colorado Division of Securities and Chairman, Special
Projects Comm., Enforcement Section, North Am. Securities Adm'rs Ass'n)
(noting that the "need for deterrence has never been greater" despite govern-
mental budgetary pressures); Tarlow, Criminal RICO Repor4 4 RICO L. REP.
341, 342 (1986) ("[F]ederal prosecutorial agencies are now crying poverty. In
recent public statements, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Cali-
fornia has cautioned that no major investigations can be undertaken because
of budgetary restrictions.").
[Vol. 71:827
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rence.3 6 Actual damages suits, in contrast, do little to promote
deterrence. Few people are deterred by the prospect of merely
having to part with ill-gotten gain, especially because litigation
is rare when recovery is limited to actual damages.3 7 In addi-
tion, treble damages serve a socially desirable compensatory
function.38 Moreover, because RICO offenders by definition
have engaged in continuous criminal activity, 39 treble damages
are especially appropriate.
RICO also affords victims of criminal activity critical proce-
dural benefits that are unavailable under traditional fraud rem-
edies. For example, its liberal venue and nationwide service of
process provisions facilitate the joining of all defendants in a
36. By analogy, the deterrent effect of treble damage litigation has been
well established in the antitrust context. See, e.g., Block, Nold & Sidak, The
Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcemen 89 J. POL. ECON. 429 (1981) (study
shows that increased antitrust enforcement and the threat of large damages
deter illegal activity in one market). See also Blue Shield v. McCready, 457
U.S. 465, 472 (1982) (noting deterrent effect of "private enforcement mecha-
nism" in antitrust); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979) (private
suits for treble damages provide "significant supplement to the limited re-
sources available to the [government]").
37. This point was clearly made in congressional testimony:
If our society authorizes the recovery of only actual damages for de-
liberate anti-social conduct engaged in for profit, it lets the perpetra-
tor know that if he is caught, he need only return the
misappropriated sums. If he is not caught, he may keep his ill-gotten
gains, and even if he is caught and sued, he knows that he may be
able to defeat part of the damages claims or at least compromise it. In
short, the balance of risk under traditional simple damage recovery
provides little disincentive to those who engage in such conduct.
Senate RICO Hearings, supra note 5, at 415 (statement of the Nat'l Ass'n of
Att'ys Gen. and Nat'l Dist. Att'ys Ass'n). Under cost-benefit analysis, the prof-
itability of crime, discounted by the risk of apprehension and the likely sanc-
tion, will ordinarily encourage criminality. Cf. R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW:
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 223-24 (1976) (The conclusion that the penalty for
an antitrust violation should be equal to the social cost is incorrect where the
violation is concealable, because "the prospective violater will discount... the
punishment cost by [the probability of being punished] in determining the ex-
pected punishment cost for the violation." Id at 223.). Treble damages are
needed to alter the cost-benefit calculation. See infra notes 79-86 and accom-
panying text.
38. Cf. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S.
Ct. 3346, 3359 (1985) (treble damages as compensatory in antitrust context);
Deere & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 658 F.2d 1137, 1146 (7th Cir. 1981)
(treble damages compensatory in patent context), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 969
(1981).
39. RICO liability is limited to persons who have engaged in a pattern of
racketeering activity. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text. Since
Sedima, the judiciary has emphasized that "continuity" is an integral aspect of
the pattern element. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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single forum convenient to the plaintiff.40 These benefits are
crucial in complex cases when defendants and witnesses are
scattered throughout the country.4 ' Judicial economy is
40. RICO's liberal venue and service of process provisions are contained in
§ 1965:
(a) Any civil action or proceeding under this chapter against any
person may be instituted in the district court of the United States for
any district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or
transacts his affairs.
(b) In any action under section 1964 of this chapter in any district
court of the United States in which it is shown that the ends of justice
require that other parties residing in any other district be brought
before the court, the court may cause such parties to be summoned,
and process for that purpose may be served in any judicial district of
the United States by the marshal thereof.
(c) In any civil or criminal action or proceeding instituted by the
United States under this chapter in the district court of the United
States for any judicial district, subpoenas issued by such court to com-
pel the attendance of witnesses may be served in any other judicial
district, except that in any civil action or proceeding no such subpoena
shall be issued for service upon any individual who resides in another
district at a place more than one hundred miles from the place at
which such court is held without approval given by a judge of such
court upon a showing of good cause.
(d) All other process in any action or proceeding under this chapter
may be served on any person in any judicial district in which such
person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.
18 U.S.C. § 1965 (1982).
41. State RICO laws, often cited as viable alternatives to the federal stat-
ute, lack this capacity. Yet, in a complex fraud action, these provisions may be
of critical importance. First, venue may be established in a forum convenient
to plaintiff. Second, if the interests of justice permit, multiple defendants-lo-
cated throughout the country-may be joined in the action. Finally, witnesses
are potentially subject to nationwide service of process. An excellent example
of the benefits of this procedure is provided by In re Alexander Grant & Co.
Litig., 110 F.R.D. 528 (S.D. Fla. 1986). Grant was a RICO action filed in the
aftermath of a massive fraud which resulted in the bankruptcy of E.S.M. Gov-
ernment Securities, Inc. (E.S.M.). Bankruptcy was effected when E.S.M. was
unable to meet $300,000,000 in outstanding obligations. Id at 530. The failure
of E.S.M. obviously caused serious investor losses and eventually resulted in
the insolvency of the Home State Savings Bank in Ohio, id. at 531, and the
shutdown of 69 privately insured thrift institutions, see N.Y. Times, Sept. 17,
1986, at D6, col. 5. Other injured investors included a dozen municipalities
throughout the country. See id. Alexander Grant & Co. was sued under RICO
for its involvement in facilitating the fraud through fraudulent accounting
practices. Gran4 110 F.R.D. at 541. Because 470 Grant partners-scattered
throughout the country-were potentially liable, § 1965(b) served to consoli-
date the action. See id. at 532 (noting, however, problem effecting service of
process). See also Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.) (massive insur-
ance fraud resulting in RICO action against multiple defendants), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1002 (1983); cf. United States v. Persico, 621 F. Supp. 842, 854
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("To compel the government to attack this alleged organiza-
tion through seriatim trials would frustrate the intent of RICO."). Aspects of
the E.S.M. litigation were eventually settled for $72.5 million. N.Y. Times,
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thereby promoted as the need for multiple trials is reduced.
Furthermore, such consolidation facilitates the orderly presen-
tation of proof and eliminates the risk of conflicting verdicts.
Critics of civil RICO argue that treble damages encourage
extortionate claims and result in windfall recoveries. 42 The im-
pact of abusive claims, however, has been grossly overstated.43
Strike suits have not been a frequent phenomenon and, to the
extent frivolous actions have occurred, most have been rejected
at the pleadings stage.44 In addition, no pattern of windfall
benefits has developed.45
Sept. 17, 1986, at D6, col. 6. See also infra note 76 (describing RICO proce-
dures vital to pursuit of action for nationwide credit card fraud).
42. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3295 (1985) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); Lacovara, Wright & Aronow, Legislative Reform of Civil
RICO: The Business Community's Perspective, in LAW & BusINESS, INC., CIVIL
RICO LITIGATION 240-41 (1985) ("The mere threat of a private RICO suit pro-
duces settlements because of the risk of treble damages, attorney's fees, expen-
sive discovery, and the public label 'racketeer.' "); see infra notes 49-50 & 205
and accompanying text.
43. A detailed analysis of the abuse controversy is contained in Goldsmith
& Keith, supra note 16. That study noted:
It is apparent.., that the abuse issue has been exaggerated and that,
to the extent abuse has occurred, the system has handled the problem
effectively and expeditiously. For example, congressional witnesses
have often broadly referred to "RICO horror stories" without provid-
ing supporting documentation. And, to the extent specific examples
of abuse have been provided, most, in fact, were dismissed at the
pleadings stage. The remainder were for the most part proper RICO
claims raising serious allegations of enterprise criminality and com-
mercial fraud.
Id. at 69-70 (footnotes omitted). See also Note, Congress Responds to Sedima"
Is There a Contract Out On Civil RICO?, 19 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 851, 881 (1986)
(summarizing arguments rejecting abuse issue).
44. See Goldsmith & Keith, supra note 16, at 88-97 (reviewing stringent
pleading requirements for fraud-based RICO actions and providing examples
of sanctions under FED. R. Civ. P. 11).
45. One commentator has observed that "[o]f the nearly three hundred
[civil RICO] suits surveyed by the ABA Task Force, as of March, 1985, only
nine had resulted in treble damage awards. Of the rest, the majority were dis-
missed." Note, supra note 43, at 859. The commentator concluded that "[i]t
almost makes one wonder what the fuss is about." Id. at 859 n.35. The perti-
nent ABA survey, of course, was conducted pre-Sedima. Nevertheless, no pat-
tern of windfall recoveries has been noted by any RICO reporting service. See
generally cases reported RICO L. REP.; Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA).
Nor is such a pattern of windfall benefits likely to occur. Studies in other
contexts have demonstrated that, given the vicissitudes of modern litigation,
treble damages are needed merely to promote the recovery of actual damages.
See Senate RICO Hearings, supra note 5, at 416 (statement of the Nat'l Ass'n
of Att'ys Gen. and Nat'l Dist. Att'ys Ass'n) ("[I]t may be necessary to author-
ize treble damages to assure that deserving victims receive actual damages.");
STAFF OF COM!. ON THE JUDICIARY, STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST TREBLE DAM-
AGE REMEDY, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS. 13-15 (Comm. Print 1984) ("[Settlements]
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RICO, of course, has been law since 1970. Since then, it has
done little to quell, fraud. Because its civil application is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon, however, it should be given an op-
portunity to develop.46
II. THE ARGUMENTS FOR REFORM
Abuse has been the principal rallying point of civil RICO
opponents. Their concern has been twofold: RICO's potential
for malicious prosecution and its abuse of statutory scope.47
The former concern involves the strike suit problem; the latter
raises broader jurisprudential issues such as federalism. Critics
also contend that RICO is unnecessary because fraud victims
already have adequate legal remedies. 48
A. THE POTENTIAL FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
Some courts have suggested that the combination of
RICO's treble damages with its labeling of defendants as "rack-
even approaching alleged actual damages [are] unusual. The great majority of
private antitrust suits are settled ...for less than the actual damages al-
leged."); Vold, Are Threefold Damages Under the Anti-trust Act Penal or Com-
pensatory?, 28 Ky. L.J. 117, 128 (1939) ("Where the ordinarily recoverable
legal damages are utterly inadequate in that they fall far below full compensa-
tion .... such twofold or threefold damage legislation provides a reasonable
and practical method for awarding liquidated compensation.") At least one
court has recognized this in a RICO context:
The delays, expenses, and uncertainties of litigation often compel
plaintiffs to settle completely valid claims for a mere fraction of their
value. By adding to the settlement value of such valid claims in cer-
tain cases dearly involving criminal conduct, RICO may arguably pro-
mote more complete satisfaction of plaintiffs' claims without
facilitating indefensible windfalls.
Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 399 n.16 (7th
Cir. 1984), affd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
46. See Senate RICO Hearings, supra note 5, at 537 (statement of Philip A.
Feigin, Ass't Securities Comm'r, Colorado Division of Securities and Chair-
man, Special Projects Comm., Enforcement Section, North Am. Securities
Adm'rs Ass'n) (noting that "not enough time has passed to allow private civil
RICO to gain widespread acceptance and understanding").
47. See Goldsmith & Keith, supra note 16, at 57, 67; Lacovara, Wright &
Aronow, supra note 42, at 240-42.
48. See, e.g., Senate RICO Hearings, supra note 5, at 632-33 (statement of
Edward I. O'Brien, President of the Securities Indus. Ass'n) (arguing that
"[tihe private right of action in RICO is not essential for redressing wrongs,
since there are ample remedies existing in both federal and state law"); id. at
769 (statement of the American Property and Casualty Ins. Indus. delivered by
Irvin B. Nathan) ("[Tihose with ordinary commercial disputes have no need
for RICO's treble-damage remedy. State common law and statutory remedies
are fully effective. .. ").
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eteers" entices litigants to file frivolous claims. 49 The result,
according to one congressional critic, is "a new form of extor-
tion sweeping the country."50 Federal courts allegedly have
been flooded with abusive claims.51
Abuse, however, is a systemic problem.52 In this respect,
RICO is not unique; any legal remedy is vulnerable to abuse.53
So, although RICO abuse may warrant concern, the issue has
been grossly distorted. Those opposing RICO have broadly al-
leged abuse without carefully examining the seriousness of
plaintiffs' allegations.M Moreover, under existing procedures,
the judiciary has expeditiously disposed of most frivolous
claims.55 RICO critics have failed to recognize that because it is
49. See, e.g., Wolin v. Hanley Dawson Cadillac, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 890, 891
(N.D. IM. 1986) ("RICO's lure of treble damages and attorney's fees draws liti-
gants and lawyers ... like lemmings to the sea."); see infra note 205 and ac-
companying text.
50. Boucher, Closing the RICO Floodgates in the Aftermath of Sedima, 31
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133, 133 (1986).
51. Id. at 143; see, e.g., Senate RICO Hearings, supra note 5, at 766 (state-
ment of the American Property and Casualty Ins. Indus. delivered by Irvin B.
Nathan) ("[H]undreds of... civil RICO actions have been brought in circum-
stances that neither involve organized crime nor contain allegations of serious
business misconduct."); see also Lacovara & Aronow, supra note 13, at 10 (ex-
tortion of legitimate businesses).
52. See Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer
Look 104 F.R.D. 181, 182 (1985) ("Resort to frivolous litigation, maintenance of
baseless defenses, and harassment of one's opponent are practices that judges
and lawyers engaged in civil litigation encounter regularly."). In fact, wide-
spread abuse resulted in the 1983 amendment of Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 11 (instituting more stringent certification of pleadings and providing
sanctions for noncompliance). See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's
note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983) (purpose of amendment was to
"discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the litigation
process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses"); Parness, Groundless Plead-
ings and Certifying Attorneys in Federal Courts, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 325, 329-
30 ("[F]ederal rulemakers [in amending Rule 11] evidently realized that plead-
ing related abuses... undermine 'the just, speedy, and inexpensive determina-
tion' of many civil actions." (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11)).
53. As one congressional witness observed, "There is scant evidence that
RICO has created baseless litigation in any greater proportion than other
causes of action .... [T]here is now no empirical data that shows RICO is
more abused than an 'average' cause of action." Senate RICO Hearings, supra
note 5, at 361-62 (statement of Steven Twist, Chief Ass't Att'y Gen., State of
Arizona).
54. For example, "numerous RICO cases, casually labeled by congres-
sional witnesses as abusive or garden variety fraud, actually have raised seri-
ous allegations of continuing enterprise criminality." Goldsmith & Keith,
supra note 16, at 79-80 (providing several illustrations); see supra note 43. See
also Cohen, supra note 4, at 157-58 (reviewing many important RICO actions).
55. Goldsmith & Keith, supra note 16, at 69, 86-92, 94-97 (reviewing the
jurisprudence under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). See Public Citi-
1987]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
far easier to file a suit than to win one,56 many cases have been
successfully resolved at the pleadings stage.57 The critics'
claims of flooded dockets lack documentation and ignore the
fact that sixty-five percent of RICO claims already enjoy in-
dependent grounds for federal jurisdiction.58
B. ABUSE OF STATUTORY SCOPE
RICO's broad scope also has been criticized, especially be-
cause it arguably supplants other federal remedies.59 This criti-
zen, PIRG Tell Congress Civil RICO Is Indispensable as Consumer Protection
Statute, 1 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) 2 (Oct. 30, 1985) (testimony of Priscilla
Budeiri, Staff Attorney, Public Citizen's Congress Watch, October 29, 1985,
before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States House of Representatives, noting dismissal of frivolous cases);
see also DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 56 (1983) (existing means sufficient for reducing meritless
litigation).
56. A Department of Justice survey of 163 civil RICO cases concluded
that 61% were successfully resolved by defendants before trial. Senate RICO
Hearings, supra note 5, at 127 (statement of Ass't Att'y Gen. Stephen S.
Trott). Although this survey was pre-Sedima, a casual review of any RICO re-
porter service establishes that this trend has continued. See Cumulative Deci-
sion Index, 4 RICO L. REP. 24-51 (1986). See also supra note 45. Perhaps for
this reason, RICO opponents rarely give concrete examples of successful ex-
tortive settlements. See Goldsmith & Keith, supra note 16, at 69 n.67.
57. For example, a recent law review article by Representative Frederick
C. Boucher, a leading RICO critic, cited numerous cases of alleged abuse with-
out explicitly mentioning their pretrial dismissal. Boucher, supra note 50, at
135 n.7, 140 nn.36-37 & 39. Each case cited was dismissed before trial. See also
Lacovara & Aronow, supra note 13, at 2-3, 9.
58. Senate RICO Hearings, supra note 5, at 127 (statement of Ass't Att'y
Gen. Stephen S. Trott summarizing a Department of Justice study). Although
acknowledging that RICO's treble damage provision may have provided the
lure for some of these cases, the study "suggests that the burden of private
RICO suits on the judiciary is not a particularly heavy one." Id. at 136. More-
over, according to the Administrative Office of the United States Court, only
614 civil RICO cases were filed between September 1985 and June 1986. 614
Civil RICO Suits Filed Between September, 1985 and June 30, 1986, 5 RICO L.
REP. 246 (1987). This is a fraction of the 25,000 cases filed annually. See id.
59. This concern was emphasized in Justice Marshall's Sedima dissent:
The civil RICO provision... stretches the mail and wire fraud stat-
utes to their absolute limits and federalizes important areas of civil
litigation that until now were solely within the domain of the states.
In addition to altering fundamentally the federal/state balance in
civil remedies, the broad reading of the civil RICO provision also dis-
places important areas of federal law. For example, one predicate of-
fense under RICO is "fraud in the sale of securities."... By alleging
two instances of such fraud, a plaintiff might be able to bring a case
within the scope of the civil RICO provision. It does not take great
legal insight to realize that such a plaintiff would pursue his case
under RICO rather than do so solely [under the securities laws] ....
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cism, however, is misleading. RICO does overlap with other
federal statutes, but the overlap is neither complete nor unde-
sirable.60 For example, not every securities or antitrust claim
can be routinely converted into a RICO action.61 Thus, RICO
does not supplant such legislation; rather, it serves a useful
supplemental function.62 Such legislative gap-filling is a well-
established aspect of our jurisprudence.63
Indeed, the federal securities laws contemplate only compensatory
damages and ordinarily do not authorize recovery of attorney's fees.
By invoking RICO, in contrast, a successful plaintiff will recover both
treble damages and attorney's fees.
More importantly, under the Court's interpretation, the civil
RICO provision does far more than just increase the available dam-
ages. In fact, it virtually eliminates decades of legislative and judicial
development of private civil remedies under the federal securities
laws.
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3294-95 (1985) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). See, e.g., Senate RICO Hearings, supra note 5, at 651 (statement of
Donald Egan, Esq.) ("[U]nless remedial steps are taken by Congress RICO
may soon replace virtually every existing federal regulatory scheme insofar as
private remedies are concerned."); id. at 129 (statement of Ass't Att'y Gen.
Stephen S. Trott summarizing criticism that RICO's "use primarily as a rem-
edy for fraud has resulted in the unnecessary and unwise federalization of an
area of law that should be reserved to the states").
60. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 383 (1983) (" 'The
fact that there may well be some overlap is neither unusual nor unfortu-
nate."' (quoting United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 771 (1979) (quoting
SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 468 (1969)))). Justice Marshall, in his
Sedima dissent, see supra note 59, failed to acknowledge his Huddleston ma-jority opinion in which overlap between securities laws was approved. Such
overlap is quite common. For example, see Rosenberg v. United States, 346
U.S. 273, 294 (1953) (overlap of criminal laws); Edwards v. United States, 312
U.S. 473, 484 (1941) (same); Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 934(2d Cir. 1983) (overlap between arbitration provisions); Nilsen v. City of Moss
Point, 701 F.2d 556, 561 (5th Cir. 1983) (overlap between civil rights laws).
61. RICO requires proof of certain elements that are not required in other
contexts. For example, in the following securities cases, critical elements were
deemed absent: Bennett v. United States Trust Co., 770 F.2d 308, 315 (2d Cir.
1985) (enterprise), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 800 (1986); Clodfelter v. Thuston, 637
F. Supp. 1034, 1040 (E.D. Mo. 1986) (pattern); Modern Settings, Inc. v. Pruden-
tial-Bache Sec., Inc., 629 F. Supp. 860, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (corporation cannot
be both liable person and enterprise conducting racketeering activity); cf. Dan
River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 290-91 (4th Cir. 1983) (noting need for crimi-
nal intent). For this reason, it is often not practical to convert a securities case
into a RICO claim. See Bertz, Opinion, 2 RICO L. REP. 353, 354 (1985). Cf.
generally Rand v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 794 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1986) (plain-
tiff unable to establish RICO, securities, or antitrust violations).
62. The recent Wall Street insider trading scandal demonstrates this
point. Insider trading may injure many investors beyond the direct purchasers
who may sue under the securities laws.
63. See cases cited supra note 60. Another example of such supplementa-
tion is in the area of labor relations. In considering whether civil RICO is ap-
plicable to the activities of a mob-dominated union, the Third Circuit Court of
1987]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
RICO's breadth, however, has also triggered federalism ob-
jections. States have traditionally provided the forum for
claims grounded in fraud or routine breach of contract. RICO
arguably encroaches upon that domain" because it includes
mail and wire fraud as predicate violations.65 Because a "pat-
tern of racketeering" ostensibly can be established by alleging
the occurrence of two predicate violations within a ten-year pe-
riod, critics contend that virtually every business dispute can be
federalized into a racketeering claim.
6 6
This perspective, however, misconceives both the current
nature of RICO and the essence of federalism. RICO's pattern
requirement was designed to bring continuing enterprise crimi-
nality within its scope.67 In Sedima, the Supreme Court sug-
gested that courts had been interpreting this requirement too
Appeals ruled that RICO is not preempted by the Labor Management Report-
ing and Disclosure Act. United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
780 F.2d 267, 280 n.13 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2247 (1986). The
two laws were considered as serving different purposes and RICO, in particu-
lar, was viewed as supplementary. Id The court also observed that any over-
lap between the two statutes was not complete. Id at 282 n.16.
64. "[Civil RICO's opponents argue that Congress never explicitly consid-
ered the need for a federal fraud remedy and that no such remedy is necessary
... given the fact that federal and state statutes make serious fraud a crime
... ." Senate RICO Hearings, supra note 5, at 129 (statement of Ass't Att'y
Gen. Stephen S. Trott); id. at 634 (statement of Edward I. O'Brien, President
of the Securities Indus. Ass'n) (contending that "RICO has completely federal-
ized what heretofore has been considered the province of state courts-that is
the resolution of common garden variety disputes"). See also supra notes 48 &
59.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp. III 1985).
66. The following commentary is typical of arguments presented to Con-
gress: "Civil causes of action under RICO are only limited by the imagination
of the plaintiff's attorneys .... [A]limost any contractual situation involving
communication via telephone or the mails-and we are here talking about es-
sentially every contract-is fair game for a RICO action." Senate RICO Hear-
ings, supra note 5, at 224 (statement of A. DiBuono, Senior Vice President and
Gen. Counsel to Colt Indus., Inc.). See, e.g., Eastern Corporate Fed. Credit
Union v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 639 F. Supp. 1532, 1535 (D. Mass.
1986) ("[lit is the rare transaction that does not somehow rely on extensive use
of the mails or the telephone."); Frankart Distribs., Inc. v. RIR Advertising,
Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1198, 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (noting that most business transac-
tions involve mails).
67. "The target of [RICO] is thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration of
legitimate business normally requires more than one 'racketeering activity'
and the threat of continuing activity to be effective." S. REP. No. 617, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969), cited with approval in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3285 n.14 (1985). See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.
576, 583 (1981) (noting that proof of an association-in-fact enterprise requires
evidence that "associates function as a continuing unit"); TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 28, at 72 ("The 'pattern' element.., was designed to limit its appli-
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loosely. Justice White stated that although two predicate acts
are a statutory minimum, a pattern is not established absent
sufficient allegations of predicate activity establishing "con-
tinuity plus relationship." 68 Since Sedima, most federal courts
have adopted this formulation and have rejected RICO claims
not involving multiple criminal episodes. 69 Thus, civil RICO no
longer ensures easy access to a federal forum.70 Most RICO
cation to planned, ongoing, continuing crime as opposed to sporadic, unrelated,
isolated criminal episodes.").
68. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14. "Indeed," Justice White observed, "in
common parlance two of anything do not generally form a 'pattern.'" Id
69. As one court aptly observed, "Sedima... clearly creates a whole new
ballgame." Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp.
828, 833 (N.D. Ill. 1985). For recent cases applying the Sedima pattern concept,
see Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) t 93,106, at
95,438-39 (10th Cir. Jan. 20, 1987) (affirming dismissal for lack of continuing
fraudulent activity); Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806
F.2d 1393, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding plaintiff's allegations insufficient to
establish Sedima's requirement of "threat of continuing activity"). Most
courts have held that pattern requires proof of either "multiple episodes" dem-
onstrating a threat of continuity or "multiple schemes." See Lipin Enters., Inc.
v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1986) (reviewing case law); compare, e.g., Papai v.
Cremosnik, 635 F. Supp. 1402, 1407-13 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (reviewing case law and
adopting modified multiple episode test); Temporaries, Inc. v. Maryland Nat'l
Bank, 638 F. Supp. 118, 121-25 (D. Md. 1986) (same) with Superior Oil Co. v.
Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 257 (8th Cir. 1986) (reviewing case law and adopting
multiple scheme requirement); Small v. Goldman, 637 F. Supp. 1030, 1034
(D.N.J. 1986) (same); Professional Assets Management, Inc. v. Pann Square
Bank, N.A., 616 F. Supp. 1418, 1423 (W.D. Okla. 1985) (same). See generally
Steinhouse & Baker, Post-Sedima "Pattern" Litigation-Perusing Acts, Epi-
sodes, Schemes and Patterns, 2 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) pt. 2, at 1 (Nov. 5, 1986).
Of these approaches, the latter is more stringent since it excludes single
scheme situations consisting of multiple criminal episodes. This approach,
however, is unduly restrictive. See infra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
On the other hand, a minority of courts have continued to allow two acts to
constitute a pattern. See, e.g., United States v. Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184, 192 (2d
Cir. 1986); R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1354-55 (5th Cir.
1985); Systems Research, Inc. v. Random, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 494, 497 (N.D. Ill.
1985).
Despite the minority holdings, the impact of Justice White's suggestion
has been profound. Every month, for example, the RICO Law Reporter up-
dates RICO "pattern" cases. The vast majority reject single episode occur-
rences. See, e.g., Recent Decisions, 3 RICO L. REP. 355, 373-78, (1986) (March);
Recent Decisions, 3 RICO L. REP. 499, 514-20 (1986) (April); Recent Decisions,
3 RICO L. REP. 660, 677-82 (1986) (May); Recent Decisions, 3 RICO L. REP.
819, 828-32 (1986) (June); Recent Decisions, 4 RICO L. REP. 69, 83-90 (1986)
(July); Recent Decisions, 4 RICO L. REP. 215, 230-35 (1986) (August); Recent
Decisions, 4 RICO L. REP. 344, 361-67 (1986) (September); Recent Decisions, 4
RICO L. REP. 502, 519-29 (1986) (October); Recent Decisions, 4 RICO L. REP.
667, 687-89 (1986) (November).
70. See, e.g., Temporaries, Inc. v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 638 F. Supp. 118,
122 (D. Md. 1986) ("Prior to Sedima, some courts were willing to find the req-
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critics fail to mention this development. 71
Nor does RICO impinge on legitimate federalism concerns.
Such concerns are properly raised when federal jurisdiction is
artificially asserted to deprive states of authority to regulate
their own affairs.72 Given the multibillion-dollar impact of
uisite pattern ... in any case in which there were two predicate acts."); L.
SAND, J. SIFFERT, W. LOUGHLIN & S. REISS, MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS T 52.02, at 52-16 (1986) (noting pattern element was "easy" to establish
pre-Sedima); Steinhouse & Baker, supra note 69, at 2 (noting that "the lower
courts have not hesitated to accept the Supreme Court's challenge" and citing
case law indicating that the pattern issue "has become a mountain overshad-
owing much of the RICO landscape").
71. For example, in arguing that Sedima "opened wide the gates of the
federal courts," Boucher, supra note 50, at 134, Representative Boucher cited
only pre-Sedima authority. Id at 135 n.10, 140 nn.36-39. Furthermore, his
claim that RICO may be alleged merely through "two telephone calls, two let-
ters, or one of each," id. at 139, ignores the Sedima pattern guidelines. See
aiso Senate RICO Hearings, supra note 5, at 760-68 (statement of the American
Property and Casualty Ins. Indus. delivered by Irvin B. Nathan); id. at 648
(statement of Donald Egan, Esq.); id. at 622-25 (statement of John Marshall
Finch, Esq., Arthur Young & Co., on behalf of the Nat'l Ass'n of Manufactur-
ers); id. at 631 (statement of Edward I. O'Brien, President of the Securities In-
dus. Ass'n); Lacovara & Aronow, supra note 13, at 6.
Although a few courts have not followed this trend, see supra note 69, re-
duced federal jurisdiction may be ensured simply by codifying Justice White's
pattern guidelines. In addition to stressing "continuity plus relationship,"
Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14, Justice White observed that a useful definition
of pattern is contained in another provision of the Organized Crime Control
Act. Under this provision, "'criminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces
criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, vic-
tims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguish-
ing characteristics and are not isolated events."' Id- (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3575(e) (1982)). The proper interpretation of this text is discussed infra
notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
72. For example, the Supreme Court has held that "Congress may not ex-
ercise [the power to regulate commerce] so as to force directly upon the States
its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral gov-
ernmental functions are to be made." National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833, 855 (1976). Significantly, Usery was subsequently overruled in a man-
ner that broadened the federal government's powers. See Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547-51 (1985) (federal government
may directly regulate state functions; the principal limit on its commerce
power lies with Congress). Moreover, Garcia still recognized that "[t]he es-
sence of our federal system is that within the realm of authority left open to
them under the Constitution, the states must be equally free to engage in any
activity that their citizens choose for the common weal." Id. at 546. Accord-
ingly, since RICO does not preempt the states in this area, federalism princi-
ples have not been violated. Indeed, RICO's constitutionality on this basis has
not been seriously questioned. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 130-31
("Nor does the statute appear to be subject to constitutional attack based upon
. . . state sovereignty grounds pursuant to the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments."); cf. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-87 (1981) (noting that
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fraud in our society, no stretching of the commerce clause is re-
quired to recognize that this problem must be addressed from a
national perspective. 73 Enterprises engaged in fraud frequently
transcend state boundaries and produce victims throughout the
country.74 State laws are ill-equipped to handle such cases. To
their credit, many jurisdictions have enacted state RICO laws,75
but such measures often are incapable of handling complex
claims.76 Moreover, recovery should not depend on whether a
RICO confers joint jurisdiction over certain state offenses and stating that
"[tjhere is no argument that Congress acted beyond its power in so doing").On the contrary, RICO may be a classic example of "cooperative federalism"
in action. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55-57 (1964) (recog-
nizing that ours is an "age of 'cooperative federalism,' where the Federal and
State Governments are waging a united front against many types of criminal
activity"). Accord Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184, 189 (1985) (AFDC as coop-
erative federalism (citing King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968))); Hodel v.Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981) (Sur-
face Mining Act as cooperative federalism), overruled on other grounds, Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 308 (1980) (medicaid as cooperative federalism (citing King v. Smith,392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968))). See also Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36
VA. L. REv. 1, 19 (1950) (advocating joint approach to mutual problems); Red-
ish, Supreme Court Review of State Court "Federal" Decisions: A Study in In-
teractive Federalism, 19 GA. L. REV. 861, 875 (1985) (federal and state
sovereigns as a cooperating unit).
73. See supra note 31.
74. For an example of a complex nationwide fraud operation and its crip-
pling effects, see supra note 41. Furthermore, the impact of fraud may tran-
scend national borders. See, e.g., J. CONKLn, ILLEGAL BuT NOT CRIMINAL 8(1977) (reporting loss of international trust occasioned by fraud).
75. Twenty states have enacted "little RICO" laws containing a private
civil remedy. For a list of those states, see Cohen, State RICO Statutes, 4 RICO
L. REP. 660, 660-62 (1986). Note, however, that not all of these laws adequately
address fraud. Delaware has imposed a prior conviction requirement; Missis-
sippi and Rhode Island do not include fraud predicates; North Carolina andOhio include a "fraud plus" requirement; and Hawaii limits recovery to actual
damages. See id.
76. Critical components to civil RICO are the availability of nationwide
service of process and the potential for joinder of all target defendants. See
supra notes 40-41. The utility of these provisions was demonstrated in a suc-
cessful civil action initiated by VISA and MasterCard:
The defendants used or attempted to use credit card ... bank ac-
counts in [seven states]. At the time of our lawsuit, key witnesses and
defendants were spread throughout the country. It was only through
RICO and the resulting availability of the federal courts and nation-
wide service of process and subpoena power that we were able tobring an effective lawsuit. By its nature, RICO allows the bringing of
a lawsuit that presents a full picture of a criminal enterprise, in con-
trast to a state court fraud action encompassing only a segment of the
overall scheme.
Senate RICO Hearings, supra note 5, at 709-10 (statement of Daniel H. Bookin,
Esq.).
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particular state has enacted a RICO law. Finally, because
RICO does not preempt state jurisdiction, federalism is not
properly called into question.77 It is an illusory issue.78
RICO critics maintain that a federal racketeering remedy
is superfluous and that other federal and state laws provide ad-
equate relief.79 Such arguments, however, ignore the deter-
rence and compensatory functions served by the availability of
treble damages and attorneys fees.80 By contrast, existing alter-
natives, which generally only authorize actual damages and do
not provide for counsel fees,8 ' are plainly inadequate. Counsel
fees are essential because they encourage litigants to undertake
complex cases 2 and discourage defendants from resisting valid
77. See supra note 72.
78. It is interesting to note that the same forces opposing RICO on feder-
alism grounds have sought to enact preemptive national tort reform. For ex-
ample, Senator Orrin Hatch has both criticized civil RICO, see Senate RICO
Hearings, supra note 5, at 231 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch), and proposed
national tort reform. See S. 1804, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (providing for
"Federal incentive grants to encourage State health care professional liability
reform"). Tort law, however, has traditionally been within state domain. See
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 282 (1980); Note, The Constitutionality of
Statutes of Repose: Federalism Reigns, 38 VAND. L. REV. 627, 654 (1985).
79. See supra note 48.
80. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
81. For example, recovery under the securities laws is limited to actual
damages. See, e.g., Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 106 S. Ct. 3143, 3153 (1986) (quot-
ing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734 (1975)); supra
note 59 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3294-95 (1985)
(Marshall, J., dissenting)); Note, supra note 43, at 870-71.
82. For many fraud victims, "'actual losses are less than the costs of a
lawsuit.'" Note, supra note 43, at 875 (quoting testimony of Pamela Gilbert
for the United States Public Interest Research Group). Because "[t]he reali-
ties of litigation today usually require a plaintiff to enter a one-third contin-
gent fee arrangement with an attorney, [the recovery] is often not enough to
pay counsel for bringing suit." Statement of Priscilla Budeiri, Staff Attorney,
Public Citizen's Congress Watch, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Jus-
tice, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives 9
(Oct. 24, 1985) (on file at University of Minnesota Law Review office). The
case of Gregory v. Atlantic Permanent Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Civil No. 84-
620-N (E.D. Va. 1984) provides a dramatic example of this point. Gregory in-
volved allegations of a systematic scheme in which lower middle class victims
suffered fraudulent mortgage foreclosures of their homes. Attorneys fees
awarded for the complex action approximated $551,000, between four and one-
half to five times the base settlement of the original nine plaintiffs combined.
Id. at 2-9. Quite clearly, absent an attorneys fee provision, plaintiffs would not
have been able to secure representation. Sadly, this is often the case with se-
curities fraud victims who are unable to resort to civil RICO. Cf. Bertz, Opin-
ion, 2 RICO L. REP. 353, 355 (1985) ("Step into the shoes of persons
emotionally and economically decimated by fraudulent conduct who are then
told that even if they go through the additional drain and risk of loss of a law-
[Vol. 71:827
RICO REFORM
claims with a barrage of motion practice.83 Treble damages also
are needed 4 because all complaints, even meritorious ones, in-
volve a risk of loss. Because attorneys fees under RICO are
only available to successful claimants, every plaintiff risks pay-
ing counsel costs if the case is lost or even settled.8 5 Given this
risk, many potential plaintiffs would forego suit if the ultimate
recovery were limited to actual damages.8 6 In addition, existing
alternatives also lack RICO's procedural advantages.8 7
Ultimately, the historical record of failure of traditional
remedies to combat widespread problems such as fraud may be
the best response to these RICO critics.88 If such remedies had
suit, they cannot be made whole because the securities laws do not provide for
recovery of attorney's fees.").
83. Corrigan, Rolling Back RICO, 18:5 NAT'L J. 2114, 2116 (1986) (noting
statement of Mark P. Cohen, Managing Editor of RICO Law Reporter, that in-
stitutional defendants are "able to scare off less affluent claimants with the
threat of a paper blizzard"). See Budeiri, The Prior Conviction Requirement:
Repeal of Private Civil RICO, 4 RICO L. REP. 336, 337 (1986) ("Attorney's fees
... also discourages [sic] unscrupulous defendants from conducting dilatory
and unnecessarily expensive litigation in the hope of reducing or eliminating
the value of the litigation for the plaintiff.").
84. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
85. See Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Liebowitz, 570 F. Supp. 908, 912-13(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (no counsel fees for settled litigation), aff'd 730 F.2d 905, 907-
09 (2d Cir. 1984) (damage award prerequisite to receiving counsel fees).
86. This is especially true since emotional stress and other intangibles are
not RICO compensable. RICO recovery is limited to "business and property"
losses. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). See, e.g., Drake v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 782
F.2d 638, 644 (6th Cir. 1986) (denying RICO recovery for personal injury);
Kouvakas v. Inland Steel Co., 646 F. Supp. 474, 476-77 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (requir-
ing a "proprietary type of damage" for recovery under RICO); Van Schaik v.
Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1137 (D. Mass. 1982) (stating
that "courts should limit RICO recovery to business loss"). One commentator
has observed that such relief under RICO advances a number of functions:
Treble damages blend features of compensatory damages and deter-
rence to create an effective remedial tool. They compensate the vic-
tim, but unlike traditional damages, they also compensate for
accumulative harm. By providing full compensation for all legal and
accumulative harm, they further act as an incentive to private citizens
to bring suit against RICO violators and, since they are mandatory,
they create a strong deterrent.
Note, Treble Damages Under RICO: Characterization and Computation, 61
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 526, 533 n.38 (1986).
87. See supra notes 40 & 76 and accompanying text.
88. Representative John Conyers made this point eloquently during the
RICO debates:
[W]hen you say there are other equally effective remedies available to
these plaintiffs, you are talking to the chairman who has heard this
refuted at least a dozen times in the past year by prosecutors, schol-
ars, law professors, plaintiffs, and consumer groups-15 separate
times we've heard testimony refuting this incredible fallacy.
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sufficed, a RICO controversy would not have developed. The
law would have been shunned, not vigorously embraced. Prop-
erly viewed, then, RICO is neither a source of systemic abuse
nor a redundant remedy. Some reform may nevertheless be
warranted. Such reform should be narrowly tailored to address
only legitimate concerns. Presently, there is a disingenuous as-
pect to RICO reform. For the most part, proposals advanced by
RICO critics have sought to disembowel the statute rather than
limit the reform to legitimate concerns.
III. CRITICAL "REFORM"
Sedima 9 spurred Congress to consider RICO reform. Be-
cause Sedima sustained civil RICO by rejecting the judicially
imposed prior conviction and special damages requirements,90
congressional critics initially responded with bills seeking to
codify these limitations.91 Another restrictive proposal sug-
gested a so-called "fraud plus" requirement for civil RICO's
pattern element; this meant that a pattern could not be estab-
lished without proof of some nonfraud predicate.92 Although
less drastic measures were also advanced, 93 the more restrictive
bills garnered the most support.
94
When these initial reform bills failed to progress, RICO
critics advanced a so-called "compromise" bill. The bill would
have eliminated both civil RICO's racketeering label and, for
private plaintiffs, the treble damages remedy; it would have se-
verely curtailed respondeat superior liability; and it would have
elevated the burden of proof and imposed a short limitations
period.95 To RICO advocates, however, this package was hardly
House Subcommittee Approves Bill Eliminating RICO's Treble Damage Provi-
sion, 2 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) 2, 7 (Aug. 20, 1986).
89. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
90. Id. at 3278.
91. S. 1521, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (special injury requirement); H.R.
2943, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (prior conviction requirement). See infra
notes 99-125 and accompanying text.
92. S. 1521, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
93. E.g., H.R. 5391, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); H.R. 5290, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986); H.R. 4892, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); H.R. 3985, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985); H.R. 2517, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
94. For example, H.R. 2943, the prior conviction bill advanced by Repre-
sentative Boucher, had 158 cosponsors. 132 CONG. REC. H9371 (daily ed. Oct. 7,
1986). All of the proposed bills are set forth in the Appendix.
95. See H.R. 5445, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). Note that this version of
H.R. 5445 was introduced on August 15, 1986. 132 CONG. REc. H6444 (daily ed.
Aug. 15, 1986). It should not be confused with the substituted version of H.R.
5445 that passed the House of Representatives on October 7, 1986. See 132
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a compromise.9 6 As the Ninety-ninth Congress drew to a close,
the House of Representatives substituted a more moderate text,
but that version was tabled in the Senate.9 7
None of the RICO reform proposals became law. Because
RICO critics have promised to renew reform efforts,98 however,
the relative impact of the proposals must still be fully under-
stood. Part III thus surveys the leading anti-RICO reform
proposals.
A. THE PRIOR CONVICTION REQUIREMENT
The first RICO reform bill proposed, H.R. 2943, would have
imposed a prior conviction requirement for a civil RICO
claim. 99 Under this amendment, claimants would have to estab-
lish that a defendant "was convicted of racketeering activity or
of a violation of section 1962."100 Because a prior conviction re-
quirement expeditiously culls out unfounded claims, this propo-
sal initially received widespread support.10 ' Unfortunately,
such "reform" would have emasculated civil RICO. Because
the vast majority of crimes are never prosecuted, private en-
forcement would have been rendered useless. 0 2 For similar
CONG. REC. H9365-66 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986). See infra notes 146-48 and accom-
panying text.
96. Budeiri, Civil RICO Criticism Invalid Upon Inspection, Nat'l L.J.,
Oct. 6, 1986, at 12, col. 2 (letter to the editor). See infra notes 132-45 and ac-
companying text.
97. 132 CONG. REC. H9365-66 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986); 132 CoNG. REC.
S16,704 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986).
98. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. S16,699 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986) (statement of
Sen. Hatch).
99. See Appendix.
100. H.R. 2943, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985).
101. See supra note 94; see Boucher, supra note 50, at 144 (noting simplicity
of the prior criminal conviction requirement as a solution).
102. For this reason, most prosecutors have opposed the prior conviction
proposal:
[Tihe requirement of a prior criminal conviction would drastically re-
strict the private plaintiffs access to the courts. Requiring a prior
criminal conviction reduces the RICO civil statute to a trivial remedy.
This result is illustrated by considering the number of civil and crimi-
nal actions filed in federal court in the areas of antitrust and securi-
ties.... [MIn the antitrust area, 1200 civil actions are filed each year,
while only 74 criminal cases are brought. Under securities and re-
lated laws, 3000 civil actions are filed each year, while only 26 crimi-
nal actions are brought. Requiring a prior criminal conviction in
either of these areas would castrate the civil remedies available under
these statutes. A similar result would obtain under RICO. Indeed,
that is the not-too-well-hidden purpose of those who recommend the
criminal conviction limitation. It would turn RICO's promise of reme-
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reasons, the Supreme Court rejected a prior conviction require-
ment in the antitrust context.1 03 In fact, the concept is unprec-
edented in civil law.10 4 Moreover, because Congress intended
civil RICO to supplement rather than be dependent upon law
enforcement, 0 5 H.R. 2943 would have fundamentally under-
mined RICO's legislative design. With unprecedented budget-
ary constraints diminishing prosecutions,10 6 eliminating the
private enforcement mechanism is rather ill-timed.
The prior conviction approach also is arbitrary and artifi-
cially simplistic. The approach is arbitrary because recovery
rights for similarly situated plaintiffs would depend on whether
the defendant had a prior conviction. Moreover, even plaintiffs
fortunate enough to qualify would not be compensated to the
extent that convictions were not obtained for each act causing
injury.10 7 The reform is artificially simplistic because it fails to
dial relief... into a sham. Congress ought not be a party to that kind
of legislative fraud.
Senate RICO Hearings, supra note 5, at 437-38 (statement of the Nat'l Ass'n of
Att'ys Gen. and Nat'l Dist. Att'ys Ass'n). See Statement of John C. Keeney,
Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., Criminal Division, before the Subcommittee on Crim-
inal Justice, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives 51-52
(Sept. 18, 1985) (noting that only a "fraction" of cases are prosecuted) (on file
at University of Minnesota Law Review office). Note, however, that despite its
detrimental effect on civil RICO and the private attorney general concept, the
prior conviction proposal was subsequently endorsed by the Department of
Justice. See DOJ Urges Limits on Civil RICO, Says Adopt Prior Conviction
Requirement 2 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) 1 (Aug. 6,1986). This endorsement has
been recently criticized. See Goldsmith & Maynes, The Undermining of Civil
RICO, CRiM. JUST., Spring 1987, at 6.
103. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 52 (1912)
(stating that such a requirement would "take from the statute a great deal of
its power").
104. For example, although "[o]ur society knows no mark of shame more
stigmatizing than that of Cain, yet homicide may be both murder and wrong-
ful death," RICO LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION, supra note 31, at 100, a prior
conviction has never been prerequisite to a wrongful death proceeding. See id,
at 100-01.
105. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
107. These were among the reasons that Sedima rejected the prior convic-
tion concept:
It is worth bearing in mind that the [prior conviction concept] is not
without problematic consequences of its own. It arbitrarily restricts
the availability of private actions, for lawbreakers are often not appre-
hended and convicted. Even if a conviction has been obtained, it is
unlikely that a private plaintiff will be able to recover for all of the
acts constituting an extensive "pattern," or that multiple victims will
all be able to obtain redress. This is because criminal convictions are
often limited to a small portion of the actual or possible charges. The
decision below would also create peculiar incentives for plea-bargain-
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consider the deleterious impact it would have on the plea nego-
tiation process, the complexity of factors affecting nolle prose-
qui decisions, and a host of other procedural difficulties. The
prior conviction requirement ignores competing pressures pros-
ecutors would encounter from victims seeking civil RICO relief
and criminal defendants seeking civil RICO immunity.1 08
Moreover, the proposal fails to recognize that nolle prosequi de-
cisions often reflect factors unrelated to guilt or innocence; im-
munity grants, prosecutorial errors, and resource limitations
often are determinative.10 9 Finally, the proposal disregards the
impact of appellate reversals. If plaintiffs are forced to await
the exhaustion of appeals, the passage of time and dissipation of
ing to non-predicate-act offenses so as to ensure immunity from a
later civil suit. If nothing else, a criminal defendant might plead to a
tiny fraction of counts, so as to limit future civil liability. In addition,
the dependence of potential civil litigants on the initiation and success
of a criminal prosecution could lead to unhealthy private pressures on
prosecutors and to self-serving trial testimony, or at least accusations
thereof. Problems would also arise if some or all of the convictions
were reversed on appeal. Finally, the compelled wait for the comple-
tion of criminal proceedings would result in pursuit of stale claims,
complex statute of limitations problems, or the wasteful splitting of
actions, with resultant claim and issue preclusion complications.
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3282 n.9 (1985). No member of
the Court dissented from this portion of Justice White's opinion. This is not
surprising. RICO should not be reformulated so that considerations "wholly
unrelated to the merits of the plaintiff's RICO claim would determine who
could recover, or even who could file a suit." Senate RICO Hearings, supra
note 5, at 438 (statement of the Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys Gen. and Nat'l Dist.
Att'ys Ass'n).
108. See Senate RICO Hearings, supra note 5, at 439 (statement of the Nat'l
Ass'n of Att'ys Gen. and Nat'l Dist. Att'ys Ass'n). Not surprisingly, most pros-
ecutors have recognized this problem:
By requiring a conviction on the RICO count, a defendant's incentive
to plea bargain to a non-RICO offense would be dramatically raised.
By avoiding a RICO conviction, the defendant would shield himself
against all civil claims, leaving the victim without RICO recourse. In
addition, the victim as a potential civil plaintiff would be an interested
witness at the criminal trial. His testimony would be subject to credi-
bility attacks because he would have acquired an interest in the out-
come.
*. . [R]equiring a prior .. . conviction would place unwarranted
political pressure on the prosecutors, since the opportunity for a
RICO victim to recover would depend on the institution and success
of the government's case.
Id. at 438-39; see also id at 105 (statement of Ass't Att'y Gen. Stephen S.
Trott); supra note 107.
109. As Justice White recognized in Sedima, "A guilty party may escape
conviction for any number of reasons .... " 105 S. Ct. at 3284. See Senate RICO
Hearings, supra note 5, at 438 (statement of the Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys Gen. and
Nat'l Dist. Att'ys Ass'n).
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assets may be substantial.110 If not, how may defense interests
be protected and of what effect would be a reversal on purely
procedural grounds? Thus, although purporting to deal expedi-
tiously with abuse, the prior conviction proposal represents my-
opic overkill.
B. THE SPECIAL DAMAGES REQUIREMENT
Before Sedima, courts often resisted civil RICO by adopt-
ing damage requirements designed to limit plaintiffs' standing
to sue, for example, by denying relief to litigants who could not
establish the occurrence of a "competitive injury." '11 1 Derived
from antitrust law, this principle limited compensation to RICO
violations that put a victim at a competitive disadvantage.
112
Other courts, also borrowing from antitrust doctrine, required
the occurrence of a "racketeering injury."1 13 Just as antitrust
plaintiffs must "prove... injury of the type the antitrust laws
were intended to prevent,"1 14 RICO plaintiffs were required to
establish a specific RICO injury independent of the damages
flowing from the predicate offenses.' 1 5
Although numerous variations of these concepts devel-
oped,1 16 Sedima effectively repudiated the special damages
principle.117 The Court viewed the principle's limitations as
110. See supra note 107.
111. See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1241
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (limiting recovery to plaintiffs with competitive injuries), affd
on other grounds sub nom. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir.
1984), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985); North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow,
547 F. Supp. 207, 211 (N.D. M. 1980) (imposing competitive injury
requirement).
112. TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 292. See cases cited supra note
111; Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restric-
tion, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1101, 1110-13 (1982).
113. See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 516 (2d Cir. 1984)
(requiring allegation of "'a distinct RICO injury'.. . caused by a RICO viola-
tion, not just ... by some of the essential elements of a RICO violation"), va-
cated, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985); Willamette Say. & Loan v. Blake & Neal Fin. Co.,
577 F. Supp. 1415, 1430 (D. Ore. 1984) (requiring that a "racketeering enter-
prise injury" be alleged).
114. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
115. TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 296-97.
116. Id. at 307-12. Perhaps because of these variations, the Supreme Court
was unable even to define the special injury concept. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3284 (1985).
117. At issue in Sedima was the racketeering injury limitation, but the
Court's decision was more broadly based. See 105 S. Ct. at 3284-86. The clear
import of Sedima was that "[w]here the plaintiff alleges each element of the
violation, the compensable injury necessarily is the harm caused by predicate
acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern, for the essence of the violation
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contrary to RICO's express language and purpose.1 8 In partic-
ular, Justice White's opinion noted that the competitive injury
doctrine would often compensate indirect victims while denying
relief to persons directly harmed by racketeering activity.119
Such deprivations would be routine because direct victims often
incur neither competitive injury nor damages beyond those
flowing from the predicate acts. For example, victims of large
scale fraud-ranging from consumers to government agencies
and most businesses-would regularly be denied RICO recov-
ery. Similarly, a union pension fund looted by mob infiltration
might be beyond RICO's civil ambit.120 Justice White quite
properly characterized this result as "topsy-turvy."' 2'
After Sedima, however, Congress considered resurrecting
this approach. Senate Bill 1521 would have limited RICO
standing to persons "suffering competitive, investment, or other
business injury as a result of a violation of section 1962 ... in-
volving a pattern of racketeering activity.' 22 Although the
bill's language appears to provide relief for investors and busi-
nesses, its legislative history indicates that standing is limited to
persons suffering a racketeering injury distinct from damages
caused by predicate acts. 123 S. 1521 thereby denies meaningful
is the commission of those acts in connection with the conduct of an enter-
prise." Id at 3286 (emphasis added).
118. Id at 3284-87.
119. See id. at 3286 n.15. Indeed, each of the three "nonexclusive" exam-
ples of competitive injury offered by the Sedima dissent involved this very
anomaly. See id at 3303 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The first two-involving
extortion to achieve market monopoly benefits-clearly contemplate recovery
solely for competitive injury. The third example, involving a business take-
over, apparently limits recovery to "infiltration injury"-that is, racketeering
injury-and does not include damages flowing from the underlying predicate
acts. See id.
120. Other illustrations abound. The pension fund loss obviously may not
be considered a competitive injury. Whether it qualifies as a racketeering in-
jury is problematic. As Justice White noted, "[W]e are somewhat hampered by
the vagueness of that concept." Id. at 3284. Plaintiffs would have to argue
that the pension loss is an infiltration, or racketeering, injury of the type con-
templated by Justice Marshall. See supra note 119. However, since the looting
will, no doubt, be effected through separate RICO predicates, how is plaintiff
to establish a distinct racketeering injury? See Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3302
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (denying RICO coverage "for injuries incurred by
reason of individual predicate acts"). Thus, in addition to limiting severely
RICO's scope, this approach is likely to create a maze of interpretative
difficulties.
121. Id at 3286 n.15.
122. S. 1521, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). See Appendix for full reprint.
123. As Senator Hatch emphasized in introducing S. 1521, the bill is based
on language in Justice Marshall's Sedima dissent stating that RICO requires
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relief to most fraud victims. The amendment makes no at-
tempt to avoid the "topsy-turvey" consequences noted in
Sedima.124 Finally, even the limited protection afforded to
businesses and investors would be scant because S. 1521 also
contained a provision requiring RICO's pattern of racketeering
activity to consist of at least one nonfraud predicate. 25 This re-
quirement would have essentially eviscerated the statute.
C. THE "FRAUD PLUS" REQUIREMENT
In rejecting a judicially created special damages require-
ment, the Sedima Court noted that "[t]he 'extraordinary' uses
to which civil RICO has been put appear to be primarily the re-
sult of ... [its] breadth of... predicate offenses, in particular
the inclusion of wire, mail, and securities fraud."126 The Court
observed that "amorphous standing requirement[s]" are not re-
sponsive to this problem.1 27 By contrast, because the vast ma-
jority of civil RICO claims are based exclusively on fraud
grounds,128 the legislative imposition of a "fraud plus" require-
ment would dramatically reduce the volume of such
litigation.129
As with the prior conviction approach, "fraud plus" reform
is simply too inclusive. Fraud-based RICO claims would be pre-
cluded without regard to the seriousness of the underlying mis-
conduct. Questions of abuse or undue scope would not be
litigated. In effect, they would automatically be resolved in
favor of the defense. Because less drastic reform is readily
pleading and proof of "injury to... competitive, investment, or other business
interests resulting from the defendant's conduct... through a pattern of rack-
eteering activity." 131 CONG. REC. S10,287 (daily ed. July 29, 1985) (statement
of Sen. Hatch) (quoting Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3302 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
This excerpt of Marshall's dissent clearly referred to both the competitive and
racketeering injury concepts. See Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3302. Moreover, Sena-
tor Hatch stated that "[t]he status clearly contemplates recovery for injury re-
sulting from the confluence of events described in section 1962 and not merely
from the commission of a predicate act." 131 CONG. REC. S10,286 (daily ed.
July 29, 1985) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
124. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
125. See Appendix.
126. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3287. See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note
28, at 239 ("The perceived abuse of Civil RICO ... results directly from inclu-
sion of ... fraud [predicates] .... "). Justice White also indicated that im-
proper application of the pattern element was responsible for RICO's
widespread use. See Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3287.
127. 105 S. Ct. at 3287.
128. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
129. See 131 CONG. REC. S10,288 (daily ed. July 29, 1985) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
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available,130 no need exists for such a restrictive measure.
White collar fraud is too serious a national problem to be given
civil RICO immunity.' 3 ' This may explain why the Ninety-
ninth Congress did not enact "fraud plus" and other blatant ef-
forts to destroy the remedy.
D. THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE'S PROPOSAL: H.R. 5445
Last July, the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice proposed a civil RICO reform bill. 32 A so-
called compromise effort, H.R. 5445 would have severely re-
stricted vicarious liability under RICO and denied treble dam-
ages to private claimants. The bill also would have established
a three-year limitations period, increased the burden of proof
for fraud claims, and eliminated RICO's racketeering label. 33
Elimination of the racketeering designation is unobjection-
able.134 Similarly, raising RICO's burden of proof may be ap-
propriate under certain circumstances. 35 Providing an explicit
limitations period is certainly desirable.136 Ultimately, how-
ever, RICO reform should not denigrate enhanced damages and
vicarious liability. An enhanced remedy provision is essential
to RICO's deterrence and compensation functions.137 Respon-
deat superior liability is also a bulwark against institutional
misconduct.
The doctrine of respondeat superior normally imposes lia-
bility upon principals for actual damages caused by agents act-
ing within the scope of their employment. 38 The doctrine is
130. See infra notes 149-267 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
132. See House Subcommittee Approves Bill Eliminating RICO's Treble
Damage Provision, 2 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) 2 (Aug. 20, 1986).
133. See Appendix.
134. See infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
135. See infra notes 195-204 and accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 247-53 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 34-38 & 81-87 and accompanying text. Although H.R.
5445 would have retained treble damages for federal and state governmental
units, this was more a political accommodation than an effort to further fraud
control. State and local prosecutors strongly opposed the prior conviction re-
quirement. See Senate RICO Hearings, supra note 5, at 437-39 (statement of
the Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys Gen. and Nat'l Dist. Att'ys Ass'n). H.R. 5445 was an
attempt at appeasement. See N.Y. Crime Task Force Director Defends RICO,
Urges Subcomittee Not to Overburden Prosecutors, 2 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) 5
(Aug. 6, 1986). Moreover, when combined with curtailment of respondeat su-
perior, the actual damages provision constituted a corporate bailout.
138. W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 83 (1964) (liability of
a master for the torts of his servants); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
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based on risk allocation principles and the desire to encourage
commercial enterprises to supervise their employees closely.139
As recently as 1982, the Supreme Court stated that "'few doc-
trines of the law are more firmly established or more in har-
mony with accepted notions of social policy than [respondeat
superior].' "140 H.R. 5445, however, would have effectively elim-
inated this basis for liability. The bill proposed to limit enter-
prise liability to cases in which an executive officer or
governing board authorized or ratified the criminal acts.141 Be-
cause authorization of criminal violations is a basis for direct
rather than vicarious liability, H.R. 5445 would have limited vi-
carious liability to the rare situations involving ratification.
Ironically, Congressman Boucher, the sponsor of H.R. 5445,
maintained that its derivative liability provision actually ex-
panded the exposure of principals for RICO violations commit-
ted by agents.'1 2 This perspective was based on the judiciary's
general reluctance to apply respondeat superior to civil
RICO.143 Such reluctance, however, stems from both a hostility
to RICO and concerns that respondeat superior ought not be a
basis for treble damage liability.144 There is less reason to be-
§§ 217C, 257, 261, 262 (1958) (liability of a principal for criminal acts, loss from
tortious representations, fraud, and misrepresentations of his servant or
agent).
139. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 501 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS]; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note
28, at 348, 363-64. See, e.g., American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v.
Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 572 (1982) (vicarious liability under antitrust
laws will put "'pressure ... on [the organization] to see to it that [its] agents
abide by the law"' (quoting United States v. A&P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121,
126 (1958))).
140. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, 456 U.S. at 568 (quoting Gleason
v. Seabord Air Line Ry., 278 U.S. 349, 356 (1929)).
141. See Appendix. In addition, the bill required that the "conduct com-
plained of" must have been "intended to benefit, and did benefit [the princi-
pal]." H.R. 5445, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H9365-66 (daily ed. Oct.
7, 1986). This approach is unduly rigid. Traditionally, the question of intended
benefit to the principal has been a factor in determining "scope of employ-
ment" rather than a per se prerequisite to liability. See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY §§ 235-236 (1958); see also Old Monastery Co. v. United
States, 147 F.2d 905, 908 (4th Cir.) ("We do not accept benefit as a touchstone
of corporate criminal liability; benefit, at best, is an evidential, not an opera-
tive, fact."), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945).
142. Boucher, Bill Curbing RICO's Use Advances, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 1, 1986,
at 15, col. 1; id. at 21, cols. 1 & 2.
143. Most courts have declined to apply respondeat superior to RICO. See,
e.g., Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 32-34 (1st Cir. 1986) (not-
ing majority view).
144. See, e.g., Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 24 n.9
(N.D. Ill. 1982) ("[R]espondeat superior .... perhaps permissible to establish
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lieve courts would apply the doctrine restrictively to an actual
damages statute. 45
When H.R. 5445, as originally drafted, failed to generate
enthusiasm, its text was redrafted with more moderate lan-
guage. The revised bill 1 46 retained treble damages for certain
actions filed by governmental entities and for private suits fol-
lowing a criminal conviction. It authorized "punitive damages
of up to twice the actual damages" for designated consumer ac-
tions in which "wanton disregard" could be established. In ad-
dition, the new text amended the law in four critical respects: it
eliminated the racketeering label; it refined the pattern defini-
tion to eliminate single episode transactions; it created a spe-
cific limitations period; and it imposed more stringent civil
pleading requirements.
In many respects, the revised bill was a true compromise.
It narrowed RICO's scope and curtailed the likelihood of abuse.
Although treble damages were severely restricted, the basic
RICO remedy remained intact. Because this version of H.R.
5445 passed the House of Representatives' 47 but was tabled in
the Senate by a mere 47-44 vote,148 the bill is likely to provide
the initial framework for reform in the next congressional ses-
sion. Accordingly, H.R. 5445 as revised merits careful consider-
ation. An appropriate context for comparative analysis is
ordinary civil liability, would be bizarre [under RICO] .... Under that theory
malefactors at a low corporate level could thrust treble damage liability on a
wholly unwitting corporate management and shareholders."); Dwyer & Kiely,
Vicarious Civil Liability Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act 21 CAL. W.L. REV. 324, 342 (1985) (stating that the main concern
of courts in refusing to impose vicarious liability "is whether it is appropriate
to impose a treble damage remedy on a corporation which may not have bene-
fited from the racketeering activity, and whose liability is wholly derivative").
145. In part, cases denying respondeat superior have been based on a desire
to prevent plaintiffs from circumventing the person/enterprise pleading dis-
tinction. See, e.g., Schofield, 793 F.2d at 33 ("We think it inappropriate to use
respondeat superior to accomplish indirectly what we have concluded the stat-
ute directly denies."); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1188, 1194
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("[Plaintiff] cannot rely on theories of respondeat superior to
accomplish an end-run around this required distinction between person and
enterprise under section 1962."); Intre Sport Ltd. v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.,
625 F. Supp. 1303, 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same), affd, 795 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir.
1986). That distinction, however, reflects judicial hostility to RICO rather
than principled analysis. See infra notes 228-35 and accompanying text. Pre-
sumably, a properly tailored reform statute would not encounter similar
resistance.
146. See Appendix.
147. 132 CoNG. REC. H9365-66 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986).
148. See 132 CONG. REc. S16,704 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986).
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provided in Part IV, which proposes an alternative basis for
compromise.
IV. A BASIS FOR COMPROMISE
RICO reform should seek to eliminate specific problem ar-
eas yet still preserve the remedy for meritorious cases.149 If
curtailing abuse and statutory breadth are the true purposes of
reform, a series of relatively moderate amendments would ex-
peditiously achieve this goal. Drawing upon both legislative
and judicial insights, such reform should consist of the follow-
ing elements: 1) eliminating the racketeering label; 2) making
certain RICO claims subject to arbitration; 3) tightening the
pattern requirement; 4) increasing the burden of proof; 5) re-
ducing the remedy from treble to double damages; 6) establish-
ing limited respondeat superior liability; 7) providing a specific
limitations period; 8) imposing more stringent civil pleading re-
quirements; and 9) providing special sanctions for frivolous
suits.
Set forth below is a proposed bill with accompanying com-
mentary. To promote prospects for compromise, the proposed
bill adopts the language of H.R. 5445 when appropriate. Each
provision also is compared to H.R. 5445 (as substituted). H.R.
5445 itself is rejected on somewhat anomalous grounds for sev-
eral reasons. In some respects, the bill is too tolerant of white
149. In addition, reform should seek to strengthen the statute where ap-
propriate. For example, ameliorative amendments would include the follow-
ing reforms:
(1) Providing explicit parens patriae authority for state actions brought
on behalf of private victims. This would reverse case law to the contrary. See
Texas v. Enterprise Cos., 3 RICO L. REP. 606, 607 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 1986)
("[Tio [bring suit as parens patriae], the state must have suffered an injury
that is compensable under the law upon which its claim is based.").
(2) Authorizing recovery for personal injuries (except pain and suffer-
ing). Presently, relief is limited to business and property losses. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964(c) (1982).
(3) Adding new predicate offenses to reflect changes in federal law since
1970.
(4) Authorizing equitable relief for private parties. This would reverse
case law to the contrary. See Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796
F.2d 1076, 1084 (9th Cir. 1986).
(5) Providing for international service of process.
(6) Authorizing counsel fees to a substantially prevailing plaintiff. This
would overrule case law denying fees absent recovery of a money judgment.
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
Despite the utility of such reforms, however, the present anticivil RICO
climate in Congress precludes their enactment. Consequently, they are not in-
cluded as part of the proposed reform.
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collar crime;15 0 in others, it fails to adopt available remedies for
curtailing abuse and statutory breadth.151 The following propo-
sal attempts to remedy these defects.
1. Eliminating the Racketeering Label
The heading for chapter 96 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by striking out RACKETEER INFLUENCED
AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS and inserting in lieu thereof
PATTERN OF ILLICIT ACTIVITY. In the remainder of chapter
96, the terms racketeer and racketeering are deleted wher-
ever they appear and are replaced as follows: section
1961 (l)-insert illicit; section 1961(5)-insert illicit; section
1961(7)-insert criminal; section 1961(8)-insert illicit ac-
tivity the first place "racketeering" presently appears; insert
criminal the second place "racketeering" presently ap-
pears; sections 1962 & 1963-insert illicit; section 1968(a)-
insert an illicit activity; section 1968(b) & (c)-insert illicit
activity; section 1968(f)-insert criminal the first, second,
and fifth place "racketeering" presently appears; insert il-
licit activity elsewhere.
COMMENT
Considerable criticism has been directed at RICO's applica-
tion of a racketeering label to a wide variety of white collar
crimes.1 52 The term is potentially prejudicial and may provide
undue leverage during settlement negotiations.1 53 In contrast,
the term "illicit" is neutral. 5 4 The new language also clarifies
that RICO applies to white collar crime as well as to traditional
racketeering activity. In addition, deletion of the racketeering
label responds to claims of unfair prejudice under criminal
RICO.1 5 5
Some reform proposals have sought to eliminate the racke-
150. See infra notes 213-16 & 241-46 and accompanying text.
151. See infra notes 158-64, 203-04 & 254-67 and accompanying text.
152. See Senate RICO Hearings, supra note 5, at 248 (statement of Ray J.
Groves, Chairman, Am. Inst. of Certified Public Accountants); Note, supra
note 43, at 868-71; supra notes 49-51. Significantly, many RICO critics,
although acknowledging the "racketeering" label as a problem, have indicated
that more fundamental reform is necessary. See Senate RICO Hearings, supra
note 5, at 744 (statement of the Am. Council of Life Ins. delivered by David
Albenda).
153. See sources cited supra note 152.
154. The term "criminal" is substituted where conforming language is
required.
155. See, e.g., RICO LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION, supra note 31, at 18 (rec-
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teering label only for predicate offenses involving fraud.156
Presumably, this approach regards crimes of violence or those
associated with traditional organized crime as meriting the
racketeering designation. The proposed amendment rejects
this distinction for two reasons. First, it requires a series of
complex distinctions throughout the statute. Second, it puts
white collar crime on a separate plane from other illegality. By
now, it is well established that white collar crime is neither less
serious nor more deserving of special protections than other
types of criminality.157
H.R. 5445 Comparison: The proposal essentially adopts the
terminology of H.R. 5445. Although the text reads differently,
this is attributable to matters of form and brevity rather than
to substantive differences.
2. Arbitrating RICO Claims
Title 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) is amended to read as follows:
(1) All actions arising under this subsection, which are
ommending different label and noting 1982 ABA report criticizing use of term
in prosecutions).
156. See H.R. 3985, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1985); H.R. 4892, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. §§ 4, 5 (1986).
157. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. In 1967, the President's
Crime Commission emphasized the dangers of white collar crime in terms of
economic impact and its tendency to encourage criminality generally. See
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 32-34, 47-48 (1967). Some
jurists have recognized that this is why RICO was intended to reach white col-
lar crime:
Despite the clarity of congress's language [in drafting RICO], defend-
ants argue that, since RICO's primary purpose is to eradicate organ-
ized crime, it is [not] directed . . . against businessmen engaged in
"garden variety fraud" . ... While RICO's primary focus may have
been on organized crime, when considering the statute congress also
recognized that fraud is a pervasive problem throughout our society
which causes billions of dollars in economic loss each year. Congress
further acknowledged that existing state and federal law was not ca-
pable of dealing with this problem.
... When congress provided severe sanctions, both civil and crimi-
nal, for conducting the affairs of an "enterprise" through a "pattern of
racketeering activity," it provided no exception for businessmen, for
white collar workers, for bankers, or for stock brokers. If conduct of
such people can sometimes fairly be characterized as "garden variety
fraud," we can only conclude that by the RICO statute congress has
provided an additional means to weed that "garden" of its fraud.
Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 528-29 (2d Cir. 1984) (citations omitted); see
supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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grounded in fraud, are subject to arbitration under Title 9,
United States Code.
COMMENT
RICO has been criticized for allowing ordinary commercial
disputes to be routinely federalized into racketeering cases
based on fraud. 58 Although this criticism may be overstated,15 9
the problem could be substantially reduced by subjecting con-
tract-based RICO claims to arbitration.160 For example, about
one third of the RICO cases filed are securities cases.161 Be-
cause most brokerage contracts contain arbitration clauses, the
adoption of this proposal would potentially curtail federal
RICO litigation dramatically.162 In addition, because most
other commercial contracts already contain arbitration clauses,
158. See Senate RICO Hearings, supra note 5, at 761 (statement of the Am.
Property and Casualty Ins. Indus. delivered by Irvin B. Nathan) ("Most fre-
quently, treble-damage civil RICO claims have been added to ordinary com-
mercial lawsuits."); Boucher, supra note 50, at 140 (noting that it has been
relatively simple to allege a fraud-based RICO claim in any commercial trans-
action); supra notes 59 & 66 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
160. Presently, the federal courts are divided over the arbitrability of con-
tract-based RICO claims. Compare, e.g., Jacobson v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 1197, 1199, 1202-03 (3d Cir. 1986) (allowing arbi-
tration if predicates are arbitrable and summarizing judicial conflict) with Mc-
Mahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94, 98-99 (2d Cir.)
(prohibiting arbitration of RICO claims due to strong public policy considera-
tions), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
161. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 57. Although this estimate is
derived from pre-Sedima litigation, it is consistent with present trends. See
also Senate RICO Hearings, supra note 5, at 176 (statement of Charles L. Mari-
naccio, Member of the Securities and Exchange Comm'n) (noting RICO's
profound impact on securities litigation).
162. Because federal securities claims are ordinarily not subject to arbitra-
tion, T. HAZEN, supra note 3, at 531, the exact impact of the proposed amend-
ment is difficult to gauge. "The general rule is that when a complaint states
both arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims, the arbitrable claims should be sev-
ered and judicial proceedings stayed as to such claims." Id. at 532 (footnote
omitted). In the past, courts have differed over application of the general rule
when the different claims "are so factually related or so 'inextricably inter-
twined' that severance is 'impractical, if not impossible."' Id. at 533 (quoting
Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023, 1026 (11th Cir.
1982) (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Haydu, 675 F.2d 1169,
1172 (11th Cir. 1982)). In part, courts declining severance were motivated by
the desire "to protect the exclusive federal jurisdiction over securities actions
and to avoid possible preclusive effects that arbitration proceedings may have
on subsequent federal litigation." Id. The Supreme Court, however, has re-
cently held that "the Arbitration Act requires district courts to compel arbitra-
tion of pendent arbitrable claims." Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470
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adoption of this amendment would likely increase this practice.
Thus, accounting firms, banks, and insurance companies may
routinely resort to this procedure.
Because judicial review of arbitration decisions is narrowly
limited,163 this amendment would allow most contract-based
RICO disputes alleging fraud to be privately resolved. Parties
would further benefit by being able to select an experienced ar-
bitrator who would be sensitive to the application of RICO to
such disputes. Finally, arbitration would be less time consum-
ing and less costly than litigation.164
H.R. 5445 Comparison: Unfortunately, there is no compa-
rable provision in H.R. 5445. Thus, a major opportunity to re-
move contract-based RICO claims from the federal courts has
been neglected. Presumably, H.R. 5445 achieves a broader ef-
fect by eliminating treble damages, thereby reducing the incen-
tive for litigation generally. Because contract-based RICO
claims have been a principal source of concern, however, arbi-
trability is a narrowly tailored remedy that leaves appropriate
RICO applications intact. Merely because some RICO applica-
U.S. 213, 217 (1985). In doing so, the Court noted that the preclusive effect of
arbitration proceedings was not yet established. Id, at 222.
Accordingly, even securities-based RICO claims may be subject to arbitra-
tion. Since securities claims are entitled to a federal forum, courts may effect
severances when appropriate. The preclusive effect of any arbitration proceed-
ings should be left to judicial development. Id. at 222-23. As the Supreme
Court has recently granted certiorari on the arbitrability of RICO claims,
supra note 160, further guidance on preclusion issues is likely.
163. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 764 (1983) (as
long as an arbitration award is based on an agreement, a court is bound to en-
force the award and may not review the merits even if the basis for the award
is ambiguous); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Indep.
Assoc., 790 F.2d 611, 614 (7th Cir.) (noting that review of arbitration awards is
limited), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 186 (1986); Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
§ 10 (1982) (A United States court may vacate an arbitration award only by a
showing that the award was procured by fraud or corruption or the arbitrator
exceeded his power or is guilty of misconduct.).
164. For example, former Chief Justice Burger has stated: "My own expe-
rience persuades me that in terms of cost, time and human wear and tear, ar-
bitration is vastly better than conventional litigation for many kinds of cases."
Burger, Using Arbitration to Achieve Justice, ARB. J., Dec. 1985, at 3, 6. See S.
LAZARUS, RESOLVING BusINEss DIsPUTES: THE POTENTIAL OF CoMMERcIAL
ARBITRATION 48-49 (1965) (discussing studies that indicate that arbitration is
less time consuming than is commercial litigation); Kritzer & Anderson, The
Arbitration Alternative: A Comparative Analysis of Case Processing Time,
Disposition Mode, and Cost in the American Arbitration Association and the
Courts, 8 JUST. SyS. J. 6, 18-19 (1983) (summarizing study indicating that arbi-
tration is faster than litigation and less expensive than "the cost of full
adjudication").
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tions have proved troublesome does not warrant eliminating
treble damages in most cases.
3. Tightening the Pattern Requirement
Title 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) is amended to read as follows:
"Pattern of illicit activity" means at least three illicit activ-
ity violations within a five-year period (excluding any pe-
riod of imprisonment). Taken together, the violations must
demonstrate continuing illicit conduct and be related
either to each other or to the enterprise; provided, however,
that if any violation is based on fraud, each violation must
also constitute a separate criminal episode.
COMMENT
This amendment is intended to ensure that civil RICO ac-
tions are limited to serious disputes involving enterprises en-
gaged in continuous criminal activity. Sedima 65 suggested that
defining the pattern element more restrictively would reduce
opportunities to convert ordinary business disputes into RICO
claims.1 66 Relying on legislative history, the Court emphasized
that "continuity plus relationship" are needed to constitute a
RICO pattern. 67 Most courts have since abided by this princi-
ple. 68 Some, however, have continued to apply pre-Sedima au-
thority that two predicates may constitute a pattern. 69 Others
have gone to the opposite extreme by holding that multiple
schemes are required to establish the requisite pattern. 7 0 A
middle ground also has developed. It holds that multiple epi-
sodes rather than multiple schemes are sufficient. 17 ' Given
165. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
166. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
167. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14.
168. Prior to Sedima, the Department of Justice had observed that 42% of
pre-Sedima cases involved "a single episode having only one victim." Senate
RICO Hearings, supra note 5, at 126-27 (statement of Ass't Att'y Gen. Stephen
S. Trott). Since Sedima, most courts have embraced Justice White's formula-
tion to reject single episode occurrences. See supra notes 69-70 and accompa-
nying text; infra note 172.
169. See supra note 69.
170. See id This test is criticized infra notes 174-77 and accompanying
text.
171. See supra note 69. The episode test is more flexible than the multiple
scheme requirement because under it a single scheme, consisting of distinct
multiple episodes, would ordinarily satisfy the pattern element. See, e.g.,
Temporaries, Inc. v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 638 F. Supp. 118, 122-24 (D. Md.
1986) (citing case law); Soper v. Simmons Int'l, Ltd., 632 F. Supp. 244, 253
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (scheme may include multiple episodes). As yet, no clear defi-
1987]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
such diversity, legislative direction is now appropriate.
The proposed amendment attempts to codify Justice
White's suggestion in Sedima. Accordingly, it explicitly rejects
the possibility of a two-predicate pattern. Furthermore, the rel-
evant time period is reduced from ten to five years. The most
important feature of this proposal is its emphasis on continuity
and relationship. To maintain flexibility, however, these con-
cepts are not specifically defined but instead left to judicial
interpretation.
The continuity principle is intended to ensure that persons
engaged in isolated violations are not subject to RICO liabil-
ity.172 Unless the crime itself evinces a threat of continuity,173
the passage of substantial time will ordinarily be necessary to
satisfy this element.
The relationship concept should be interpreted in light of
RICO's remedial purpose. As stated in Sedima, factors such as
similarity of purposes, results, participants, victims, methods of
commission, or other distinguishing characteristics should be
considered. 174 Because both continuity and relationship may be
nition of episode has emerged. Some courts have emphasized that each viola-
tion must be "'somewhat separated in time and place."' Id. at 253 (quoting
Graham v. Slaughter, 624 F. Supp. 222, 225 (N.D. Ill. 1985)); see, e.g., Morgan v.
Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975-76 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that "[t]he doc-
trinal requirement of a pattern of racketeering activity is a standard, not a
rule, and as such its determination depends on the facts and circumstances of
the particular case, with no one factor being necessarily determinative").
Others have viewed episode in terms of independent harmful events. See, e.g.,
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 642 F. Supp. 781,
809 (E.D. La. 1986) (ongoing acts with "independent and... harmful signifi-
cance"); Ghouth v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1325, 1336-38
(N.D. IlM. 1986) (same, citing case law). Thus, each event causing separate
harm constitutes a separate episode. Some courts have also required the mul-
tiple episodes to project a threat of continuity. See, e.g., Ghouth, 642 F. Supp.
at 1337.
172. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. As one court recently ob-
served, "The continuity requirement is aimed at curtailing use of RICO for
charges involving one transaction sliced into a series of acts which occur over a
short period of time, are not ongoing, and are not indicative of an open-ended
scheme." United States v. Freshie Co., 639 F. Supp. 442, 444 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
Many claims have been properly rejected on this basis. See, e.g., Schaafsma v.
Marriner, 641 F. Supp. 576, 581 (D. Vt. 1986) (single sale of realty not pattern);
Meadow Ltd. Partnership v. Heritage Sav. & Loan, 639 F. Supp. 643, 650-51
(E.D. Va. 1986) (single real estate transaction not pattern); Ichiyasu v. Christie,
Manson & Woods Int'l, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 187, 188, 190 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (single
theft of three art works not pattern); Grant v. Union Bank, 629 F. Supp. 570,
577-79 (D. Utah 1986) (single bank transaction not pattern).
173. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
174. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982)).
These factors were offered by Justice White as "useful" guidelines. Id Ac-
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present in single-scheme situations, proof of multiple schemes
obviously should not be required. 7 5 Nor should a relationship
cordingly, they should not be converted into prerequisites. See, e.g., infra note
176 and accompanying text.
175. The point is that a single scheme may occur over a long time period,
consist of distinct criminal episodes causing independent harm, and evince a
threat of continuity. This has been the principal justification advanced by
courts adopting the multiple episode test and rejecting a multiple scheme re-
quirement. See, e.g., Morgan, 804 F.2d at 975 (rejecting multiple scheme re-
quirement because "[o]therwise defendants who commit a large and ongoing
scheme, albeit a single scheme, would automatically escape RICO liability for
their acts, an untenable result"); Graham v. Slaughter, 624 F. Supp. 222, 225
(N.D. Ill. 1986) ("Certainly, a two year practice of embezzling funds from a
company through otherwise separate transactions constitutes a 'pattern . . I
notwithstanding the fact that the numerous acts arguably comprise a single
criminal scheme."); Temporaries, Inc., 638 F. Supp. at 123 (multiple scheme re-
quirement "unnecessarily restrictive approach because there may have been
alternative indicia of continuity"); Papai v. Cremosnik, 635 F. Supp. 1402, 1412
(N.D. Ill. 1986) (requiring proof of multiple schemes constitutes a loophole for
"clever defendants"). Thus, pattern may even be established in appropriate
situations involving single victims. See, e.g., Paul S. Mullin & Assocs., Inc. v.
Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 532, 541 (D. Del. 1986) (criticizing multiple scheme re-
quirement since "an attempt by a racketeering enterprise to infiltrate General
Motors could involve countless acts .... One could argue, however, that...
[no pattern was] involved because only one company was subverted. Under
this view, a 'pattern' would come into existence only after the same enterprise
began to infiltrate Chrysler or Ford."). Indeed, any other interpretation would
threaten to make § 1962(b) a nullity, because that provision is usually limited
to single victims. United States v. Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184, 192 & n.16 (2d Cir.
1986).
The multiple scheme requirement also creates an absurd pleading bind for
RICO plaintiffs. The bind occurs because proof of multiple schemes is often
inconsistent with proof of relationship. Thus, if plaintiff alleges multiple
schemes, defendant will argue lack of relationship because the schemes may
not involve similar "purposes, results, participants, [or] victims." Sedima, 105
S. Ct. at 3285 n.14 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982)). See supra note 174 and
accompanying text. Alternatively, allegations establishing sufficient relation-
ship may encounter the defense that pattern has not been satisfied because
only a single scheme has been alleged. Several courts have recognized this
anomaly. See, e.g., Morgan, 804 F.2d at 975 ("[T]erms 'continuity' and 'relation-
ship' are somewhat at odds with one another. Relationship implies that the
predicate acts were committed somewhat closely in time to one another, in-
volve the same victim, or involve the same type of misconduct. Continuity, on
the other hand, would embrace predicate acts occurring at different points in
time or involving different victims."); Lewis v. Sporck, 646 F. Supp. 574, 581
n.7 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (forces "plaintiff to steer between the Scylla of pleading
multiple 'fraudulent efforts' and the Charybdis of pleading 'related, non-iso-
lated' . . . acts"); Freshie Co., 639 F. Supp. at 445 ("as the acts become more
related, the same transactions lose some of their separateness"); Heritage Ins.
Co. of Am. v. First Nat'l Bank, 629 F. Supp. 1412, 1416 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (noting
possibility of single victim pattern because "[o]therwise, the requirement that
criminal acts be 'related' as well as 'continuous' would be meaningless, since
relationship in most circumstances would vitiate a finding of continuity").
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between predicate offenses be a prerequisite to finding a pat-
tern of illicit activity. If it were, enterprises engaging in diver-
sified criminality would be excluded from the scope of the
statute's reach.17 6 It should be sufficient that predicate acts are
related either to each other or to the same enterprise.
177
The proposed amendment distinguishes between actions
based on fraud and all other RICO situations. As to fraud ac-
tions, the concern is that purely jurisdictional predicate of-
fenses may be aggregated into multiple violations even though
only a single criminal episode is involved.'78 This was a com-
mon civil RICO problem before Sedima modified the pattern
requirement. 179 Accordingly, the proposed amendment explic-
itly requires proof of multiple episodes in fraud situations. In
176. RICO, of course, was designed to attack enterprise criminality. Be-
cause criminal enterprises often engage in diversified crimes, it would be inap-
propriate to require predicate violations to be related to each other. It is
sufficient if they are related either to each other or to the same enterprise.
This point was recognized by an American Bar Association committee that en-
gaged in an extensive study of RICO:
Confining the statute's application to those patterns where a direct re-
lationship existed between each of the predicate offenses would limit
the application of RICO to a single offenses pattern, including a nar-
row range of cognate or subservient offenses. For example, it might
only be possible to combine into a single pattern drug offenses and vi-
olent or corruption offenses, where the violence or corruption was
used to advance the drug activity. The Committee felt that confining
the statute in this fashion would be unwise. Modern criminal organi-
zations that are, in effect, conglomerates of crime [are] involve[d] in a
wide range of offenses; they should not be beyond the reach of the
statute. Indeed, such prosecutions might be precluded as that upheld
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981)
(drugs, arson, insurance fraud, and bribery).
RICO LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION, supra note 31, at 37.
177. See, e.g., United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1121-23 (2d Cir.)
(acts need only be related to enterprise), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980);
United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880, 899 n.23 (5th Cir.) (acts may be related to
the enterprise without relation to each other), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
As one court has noted, "In this sense, the acts are related to each other by
having a common purpose, namely . . .conducting the enterprise's affairs."
Papai, 635 F. Supp. at 1407.
178. "For example, if a scheme to defraud a single victim involves two tele-
phone conversations and the mailing of five letters, these seven incidents
should ordinarily be considered a single episode rather than seven racketeer-
ing acts constituting a pattern." Goldsmith & Keith, supra note 16, at 100.
See, e.g., Temporaries, Ina, 638 F. Supp. at 125 (phone calls and mailings "es-
sentially one set of negotiations"); Frankart Distribs., Inc. v. RMR Advertising,
Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1198, 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (multiple mailings "merely part of
. .. single transaction"); Allington v. Carpenter, 619 F. Supp. 474, 478 (D.C.
Cal. 1985) ("Together the acts [of wire fraud] comprise a single criminal
episode....").
179. See supra notes 66 & 70 and accompanying text.
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contrast, multiple episodes should not be automatically re-
quired in nonfraud situations because RICO abuse has not been
a major issue in such contexts.18 0 Moreover, single episode
crimes are sometimes motivated by some other illegality or in-
herently give rise to a threat of continuity.1 8 ' The threat of
continuity, rather than number of episodes, ought to be deter-
minative. The proposed amendment therefore retains flexibil-
ity in nonfraud cases.1 8 2 The vast majority of civil RICO claims
would still be subject to a multiple episode requirement. 183
Significantly, Department of Justice guidelines provide
that "[n]o indictment shall be brought charging a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c) based upon a pattern of racketeering activity
180. The principal concern has been the ease with which fraud predicates
can be pleaded as RICO violations. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
For example, one critical study noted that "most of the abuse occurs in 'com-
mercial fraud' cases.... [This] results directly from inclusion of mail fraud,
... wire fraud,... and 'fraud in the sale of securities' as predicate offenses."
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 239. Recently, the distinction between
fraud and nonfraud predicates has been recognized by perceptive jurists. In
Lipin Enters. Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 323 (7th Cir. 1986), the court held that
twelve acts of mail fraud did not constitute pattern in the context of a single
commercial transaction. Concurring, Judge Cudahy offered the following
observation:
I agree that plaintiff has not alleged a "pattern .... ." I think it is im-
portant to note, however, that we are dealing here with mail fraud.
Mail fraud and wire fraud are perhaps unique among the various sorts
of "racketeering activity" possible under RICO in that the existence
of a multiplicity of predicate acts... may be no indication of the requi-
site continuity of the underlying fraudulent activity. Thus, a multi-
plicity of mailings does not necessarily translate directly into a
"pattern" .... It is not clear that the same analysis would be appro-
priate in cases involving other kinds of predicate acts (like ... arson).
I& at 325 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
181. See United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1474-76 (11th Cir.
1985) (homicides occurring in single episode committed to facilitate other
crimes); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1217 (9th Cir. 1982) (extor-
tion as part of ongoing scheme), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983). See gener-
ally Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 976 (7th Cir. 1986) ("The
doctrinal requirement of a pattern of racketeering activity is a standard, not a
rule, and as such its determination depends on the facts and circumstances of
the particular case, with no one factor being necessarily determinative.").
182. Note also that the proposed amendment defines pattern for both crim-
inal and civil cases. A definition limited to civil cases would unwisely preclude
collateral estoppel, since the pattern element would have different criminal
and civil applications. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326(1979) (collateral estoppel requires identity of issues). See also infra text ac-
companying note 189.
183. Because the vast majority of civil RICO actions are based on fraud, see
supra note 29, most pleadings will have to satisfy the multiple episode
requirement.
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growing out of a single criminal episode or transaction." 18 4
Such prosecutorial restraints have been said to provide protec-
tion against abusive RICO prosecutions. 8 5 The proposed
amendment, by codifying a stringent pattern definition, should
achieve the same result in civil litigation.
H.R. 5445 Comparison: Refining the pattern element was
also a critical ingredient of H.R. 5445.186 Under the bill, a spe-
cial definition of pattern was adopted only for civil cases. To
form a pattern under the bill, at least two acts of illicit activity
must have occurred within a five-year period. Furthermore,
the violations could not be "so closely related in time and place
that together the acts constitute a single episode. '187 In 1962(c)
cases, the acts were also required to be "related to the affairs of
the enterprise."'188
Although this definition is a pronounced improvement over
present law, it is nevertheless troublesome in some respects.
First, it creates a distinction between the pattern requirement
in criminal and civil contexts. If "continuity plus relationship"
was originally viewed as critical to the establishment of pattern,
however, there is no reason to exclude it now from criminal
cases. This is especially true because, under H.R. 5445, a con-
viction provides an automatic basis for treble damages. Because
Department of Justice guidelines already define pattern in
terms of multiple episodes, the prosecution function should not
be impeded by a uniform definition.' 8 9 Second, by requiring
proof of multiple episodes in all civil cases, the definition over-
looks the possibility that single episode conduct may sometimes
evince a threat of continuity sufficient to constitute a pat-
tern. 9 0 In contrast, the proposed reform plan limits its multi-
ple-episode requirement to the area of principal controversy:
fraud-based RICO claims. Third, because "in common parlance
two of anything do not generally form a 'pattern,' "191 the two-
184. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS'
MANUAL § 110.340 (1985).
185. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3294 (1985) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) ("[P]rosecutors simply do not invoke the mail and wire
fraud provision in every case in which a violation of the relevant statute can be
proved."); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 20-23.
186. For reprint of H.R. 5445, see Appendix.
187. Id
188. Id.
189. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
191. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3285 n.14 (1985); see also
supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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predicate minimum of H.R. 5445 is problematic. For this rea-
son, the proposed reform plan adopts a three-predicate-offense
Minimum.
Finally, the definition of pattern under H.R. 5445 is in one
respect seriously misleading. Three days after the House of
Representatives voted on this bill, Congressman Boucher, the
bill's sponsor, filed an "extension of remarks" in the Congres-
sional Record. In these remarks, he suggested that the compro-
mise bill may contemplate a multiple-scheme requirement in
order to establish a pattern.192 Under this approach, long-term
single scheme activity would be excluded from RICO. Thus, for
example, the systematic embezzlement of corporate funds dur-
ing a period of many years might not qualify as a pattern. 9 3 In
fact, however, the compromise did not intend this result. The
text's choice of the term "episode" rather than "multiple
scheme" demonstrates this point.194  Given Congressman
Boucher's unfortunate comments, however, the bill's definition
of pattern requires further clarification.
4. Raising the Burden of Proof
Title 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) is amended to read as follows:
(2) In all actions arising under this subsection, the burden
of proof shall be clear and convincing evidence.
COMMENT
Civil RICO is presently governed by the traditional prepon-
derance standard. 95 Although the Supreme Court declined to
192. Representative Boucher stated:
Rather than attempt to freeze the judicial decisions on this subject,
the compromise substitute allows the courts to continue to develop
appropriate standards for deciding whether individual .. . violations
are sufficiently related but distinct [enough] that they ought to be
considered part of a "pattern"... rather than simply parts of what is
essentially the same scheme or episode.
132 CONG. REC. E3533 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1986) (emphasis added) (statement of
Rep. Boucher). Boucher's inclusion of the term "scheme" both here and in a
subsequent context, id ("a single episode of criminality or criminal scheme"),
suggests the potential continuation of the discredited multiple scheme doc-
trine. See supra note 175 & infra note 194 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
194. For this reason, Senator Metzenbaum stated that "[tihe word 'episode'
in the statute was specifically selected and should not be confused with
'scheme'." 132 CONG. REC. S16,698-99 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986) (statement of
Sen. Metzenbaum).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d267, 279-80 n.12 (3d Cir. 1985) ("[T]he appropriate burden of proof for the gov-
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address this issue in Sedima, 96 it has indicated that clear and
convincing proof should be required "where particularly impor-
tant interests or rights are at stake. 1 97 Historically, this higher
standard of proof has been applied to matters such as termina-
tion of parental rights or involuntary commitment. 198 In con-
trast, the preponderance standard has governed most civil
proceedings, including those involving the imposition of serious
civil sanctions. 99
Several policy considerations justify a heavier burden of
proof in civil RICO cases. First, the higher standard promotes
quality control over RICO litigation. Because Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already requires counsel to
certify the propriety of all complaints, 200 the higher standard
would compel parties to exercise more caution before filing a
complaint based on RICO-especially as the imposition of sanc-
tions may later be at stake. Second, because many state fraud
proceedings require clear and convincing proof,201 establishing
an identical standard for civil RICO restores the balance be-
tween the federal and state systems. Finally, the higher stan-
dard is a suitable counterbalance to the enhanced remedy
potentially available to plaintiffs.
20 2
H.R. 5445 Comparison: There is no comparable provision
in H.R. 5445. Because the House bill eliminates treble damages
ernment in a civil action under the RICO Act... is the 'preponderance of the
evidence' standard and not.., the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' or 'clear and
convincing evidence' standard."); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358
(7th Cir. 1974) ("Whether equitable relief is appropriate depends, as it does in
equity, on whether a preponderance of the evidence shows a likelihood that
the defendants will commit wrongful acts in the future. .. ."); TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 28, at 378 ("As a civil action, the ordinary expectation is
that proof of all necessary elements for a recovery need only be by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.").
196. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3282-83 (1985). The
Court intimated, however, that the preponderance standard was permissible.
Id.
197. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983).
198. Id. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982) (proceeding
to terminate parental rights); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (in-
voluntary commitment proceedings).
199. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 389-90.
200. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See infra notes 264-67 and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., Addington, 441 U.S. at 424; Pyne v. Jamaica Nutrition Hold-
ings Ltd., 497 A.2d 118, 131 (D.C. 1985); Price v. Grimes, 677 P.2d 969, 973
(Kan. 1984); Gardner v. Jones, 464 So. 2d 1144, 1148-49 (Miss. 1985); D.G.
Porter, Inc. v. Fridley, 373 N.W.2d 917, 921 (N.D. 1985).
202. Thus, enhanced damages may not be as threatening when plaintiff has
to adduce clear and convincing evidence.
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in most civil RICO suits, 20 3 however, there is less need for a
higher burden of proof. The elimination of treble damages
reduces the incentive to use civil RICO and removes a source of
leverage during settlement negotiations. The "clear and con-
vincing" counterbalance is thus no longer required. Admit-
tedly, RICO claims under H.R. 5445 would enjoy a lower
burden of proof than many state fraud actions, but this benefit
is offset by the complexity of RICO's unique pleading and proof
requirements.2 04
5. Reducing the Remedy to Double Damages
Title 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) is amended to read as follows:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of
a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor
in any appropriate United States district court and shall re-
cover double the damages he sustains and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorneys fee.
COMMENT
The criticism aimed at RICO's treble damages provision 0 5
disregards the deterrent and compensatory functions tradition-
ally served by treble damages.206 In this respect, RICO is not
unique; it is merely one of numerous federal statutes providing
this remedy.20 7 Indeed, the Ninety-ninth Congress increased
203. See Appendix.
204. Because of the complexity of RICO elements such as pattern, enter-
prise, and conduct, RICO motion practice is exceedingly intricate. See, e.g.,
Duval, A Trial Lawyer's Guide: Everything You Always Wanted to Know
About RICO Before Your Case Was Dismissed, 12 Wm. MITCHELL L. REv. 291,
311 (1986) ("A RICO complaint must be carefully crafted and well-tailored to
the facts of each case. Sloppy and ill-conceived pleading will subject the plain-
tiff to svift retribution in the form of a motion to dismiss from defense coun-
sel."); Goldstein, Aggressive Motions Key to Defense, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 1, 1986, at
15, col. 4.
205. See supra notes 42 & 49-50 and accompanying text; see also Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3302 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("uncalled-for punitive bills"); Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 747 F.2d 384, 399 n.16 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting judicial commentary regard-
ing "in terrorem settlement value that the threat of treble damages may add
to spurious claims"), affd on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985).
206. See supra notes 34-39 & 84-86 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1464(q)(3) (1982) (Home Owners' Loan Act of
1933); 12 U.S.C. § 1975 (1982) (Bank Holding Company Act); 12 U.S.C.
§ 2607(d)(2) (Supp. III 1985) (Real Estate Settlement Act of 1974); 15 U.S.C.
§ 15c(a)(2) (1982) (Clayton Act: Antitrust); 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1982) (Revenue Act
of 1916: Restraints on Import Trade); 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (Supp. III 1985) (Trade-
mark Act of 1946); 15 U.S.C. § 1693f(e) (1982) (Electronic Fund Transfer Act);
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the civil penalty for false claims from double to triple dam-
ages. 20 8 Even so, the proposed amendment reduces the author-
ized remedy under RICO to double damages. This measure is
purely a compromise. 20 9 It is designed to operate in tandem
with a proposed modification of respondeat superior liability.210
Although threefold damages may be viewed by some as exces-
sive, double damages seem immune from such criticism. For
example, in United States v. Bornstein,2 11 the Supreme Court
stated that imposition of double damages under the False
Claims Act is compensatory to make the government whole for
"costs, delays, and inconveniences occasioned by fraudulent
claims. 21 2
H.R. 5445 Comparison: Under H.R. 5445, treble damages
are available only to certain governmental entities and to plain-
tiffs who sue following a criminal conviction. Limited punitive
damages are available to designated consumers who can estab-
lish "wanton disregard. '213 Unfortunately, this approach is fun-
damentally inconsistent with the private attorney general
principle. Absent treble damages, relatively few claimants
would undertake the complexities of a RICO action.21 4 Conse-
quently, both deterrence and compensatory functions would be
undermined. Reduction to double damages would not be so del-
eterious. The potential for compensation and deterrence would
be moderated but still preserved.
The limited treble damages authorized under H.R. 5445
would not achieve the same result. Given the extent of public
sector fraud, governmental entities obviously should be able to
sue for treble damages.2 1 5 But other victims deserve the same
15 U.S.C. § 1989(a) (1982) (Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act);
22 U.S.C. § 4209 (1982) (Consular Officers: Penalty for exacting excessive fees);
30 U.S.C. § 689(b) (1982) (Lead and Zinc Stabilization Program) 35 U.S.C. § 284
(1982) (Patents); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (1982) (CERCLA); 45 U.S.C. § 83 (1982)
(Government Aided Railroads); 46 U.S.C. § 1227 (1982 & Supp. 11 1985)
(Merchant Marine Act of 1970).
208. 132 CONG. REC. H9383 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986).
209. Perhaps for similar reasons, Wisconsin's state RICO law provides for
double damages. See Wis. STAT. § 946.86(4) (1985-1986).
210. See infra notes 221-46 and accompanying text.
211. 423 U.S. 303 (1976).
212. Id. at 315.
213. See Appendix.
214. See supra notes 34-39 & 84-86 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. H.R. 5445 does resolve
an important issue by explicitly authorizing the federal government and the
states to sue as RICO victims. See Senate RICO Hearings, supra note 5, at 119
(statement of Ass't Att'y Gen. Stephen S. Trott). This conferral of authority
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remedy, especially because most fraud is not against the gov-
ernment. By distinguishing between the two, H.R. 5445 may
implicitly redirect illicit activity away from the public sector to
the private sphere. Nor does authorization of treble damages in
prior conviction cases remedy this problem. The provision suf-
fers from the same arbitrariness and artificial simplicity as did
the original prior conviction proposal.2 1 6
There is another troublesome feature to H.R. 5445. Its cre-
ation of a limited consumer exception was critical to the com-
promise. Although not applicable to certain securities
transactions, the exception apparently authorizes "punitive
damages of up to twice the actual damages" upon sufficient
proof of "wanton disregard."217 Because RICO requires proof
of criminality, wanton disregard would seemingly encompass
many situations involving knowing or intentional conduct. The
legislative history developed by Congressman Boucher's "ex-
tension of remarks," however, suggests that such damages are
to be reserved for exceptional circumstances involving "ex-
treme . . . misconduct. '218 Because this restrictive viewpoint
was not part of the intended compromise, 219 further clarifica-
quite properly extends to trustees appointed pursuant to governmental suits
for equitable relief. See generally United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1986) (civil action to eliminate corrupt union
leadership in which government acted in the interest of labor organizations).
At the same time, however, H.R. 5445 precludes local government units from
suing absent specific state statutory authority. Because local government
fraud is a pervasive problem, there is no reason to impose such a limitation.
216. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
217. See Appendix.
218. See 132 CONG. REC. E3532 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Boucher). Unfortunately, Representative Boucher's remarks also served to
confuse the meaning of punitive damages. For example, he stated that, in
evaluating a defendant's "degree of culpability," the fact finder must conclude
"that the defendant's culpability went significantly beyond what was required
simply to trigger punitive damages ('wanton' disregard), let alone what was
sufficient to justify a finding of liability." Id. At best, the meaning of this
statement is unclear; at worst it incorrectly states the law of punitive damages.
See PROSSER & KEETON ON ToRTs, supra note 139, § 2, at 9-11; S. SPEISER, C.
KRAUSE & A. GENS, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 8:45, at 805-13 (1985).
Representative Boucher also chose to expand the securities exception to
punitive damage claims by stating that such damages are unavailable "[a]s long
as the securities laws regulate the conduct, whether or not the plaintiff him-
self would have standing to press the claim." 132 CONG. REc. E3533 (daily ed.
Oct. 10, 1986) (statement of Rep. Boucher). Significantly, Senator Metzen-
baum, cosponsor of the bill on the Senate side, rejected this interpretation. 132
CONG. REC. S16,698 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986) (punitive damages unavailable only
if plaintiff is eligible under securities laws).
219. For this reason, Senator Metzenbaum rejected Boucher's formulation:
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tion is now required.
Finally, there is an anomalous aspect to this consumer ex-
ception. Because it is limited to "natural person[s]," 220 the pro-
vision denies the opportunity for punitive damages to business
institutions. As a result, although banks, insurance companies,
and similar institutions may be sued for punitive damages, this
same relief is not available to them as plaintiffs. Thus, in the
course of compromising on treble damages, H.R. 5445 ulti-
mately creates a series of irrational distinctions that fail to
maintain RICO's deterrence and compensatory value. By com-
parison, the double damages proposal offers a simple and effec-
tive alternative to treble damages. The impact of the suggested
reform should also be considered in light of the proposed modi-
fication of respondeat superior liability.
6. Modifying Respondeat Superior Liability
Title 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) is amended to read as follows:
(6) In all actions arising under this subsection, a principal
is liable for actual damages for harm caused by an agent
acting within the scope of either his employment or appar-
ent authority. A principal is liable for double damages
only if the pattern of illicit activity was authorized, ratified,
or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors, a partner,
or a high managerial agent acting within the scope of
employment
COMMENT
This proposal is intended to resolve a split of authority by
providing a definite standard for applying respondeat superior
principles to civil RICO. Most courts have declined to apply
Behavior is done in "wanton" disregard of the plaintiff's rights if it is
done in reckless or callous disregard of the rights of the plaintiff. The
term is intended to be applied as it is traditionally applied and is not
intended to require a different standard of proof than in traditional
cases ....
A plaintiff... need not prove viciousness or egregiousness in or-
der to recover punitive damages. Nor is it the intent of the amend-
ments that substantial punitive damages should be reserved only for
the most extreme cases of misconduct because all wanton and willful
conduct is extreme, vicious, and egregious.
132 CONG. REC. S16,698 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Metzenbaum).
220. See Appendix.
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the doctrine to civil RICO cases.2 21 This refusal reflects two
factors: a reluctance to impose treble damage liability on princi-
pals for low-level employee misconduct 222 and a concern that
the doctrine improperly circumvents the distinction between a
RICO defendant and an enterprise.223 Neither factor, however,
warrants outright rejection of respondeat superior liability.
Although some authority rejects respondeat superior liabil-
ity for punitive damages, this is a minority view.224 Moreover,
even the Second Restatement of Agency, which generally dis-
avows the doctrine in a punitive context, recognizes that it has
potential application to "special statutes such as those giving
triple damages. 22 5 RICO is such a special statute. Because its
purpose is remedial rather than punitive,226 respondeat supe-
rior should ordinarily apply.227
Nor does respondeat superior improperly circumvent the
distinction between a RICO defendant and enterprise. The vast
majority of courts have held that the statutory language and
the policies underlying RICO mandate this distinction in sec-
tion 1962(c) cases.225 These decisions hold that a legal entity as
221. See, e.g., Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 32 (1st Cir.
1986) (majority rejecting vicarious liability).
222. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 145; see infra notes 228-34 and accompanying text.
224. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 139, § 2, at 13 (noting poten-
tial deterrent effect and tendency to encourage closer supervision of
employees).
225. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C comment c (1958).
226. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a),
84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970) (statement of findings noting remedial purpose). See
Note, supra note 86, at 529-34 (discussing Congress's "remedial scheme").
227. Of course, if the agent is victimizing rather than benefiting the princi-
pal, liability would not lie. This is because intent to benefit the principal is an
important fact in determining respondeat superior liability. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 228, 235-36 (1958). The more difficult question is
whether liability should lie when the principal is being used to commit the
crime (for example, when the principal is the instrumentality rather than the
victim of a crime). This may be a difficult question where treble damages are
at stake, see Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context. Reflections on
Bennett v. Burg 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 237, 324 (1982); Dwyer & Kiely,
supra note 144, at 340, but not under an actual damages statute. See RESTATE-
MIENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 236 comment b, at 523-24 (1958) (noting agent
within scope of employment so long as motivated "to any appreciable extent"
by principal's business purpose).
228. See, e.g., Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 29-30 (1st
Cir. 1986) (noting majority view and citing substantial case law); Bennett v.
United States Trust Co., 770 F.2d 308, 315 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[R]equiring a com-
plaint to distinguish between the enterprise and the person conducting the af-
fairs of that enterprise . . . is supported by the plain language of section
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a RICO "person" may not associate with itself as an "enter-
prise."229 The person/enterprise distinction is deemed neces-
sary to preclude liability when the enterprise is a victim of
racketeering activity.230 Whether this distinction is also appli-
cable to other RICO sections is presently unresolved.231 The
distinction is, however, ill-advised. It reflects a general animos-
ity to RICO rather than a careful analysis of the problem. For
example, the distinction is not needed to protect victim enter-
prises. Because RICO requires criminal intent,232 such enter-
prises obviously face no liability. Moreover, the distinction
would logically preclude both criminal sanctions and the impo-
sition of equitable sanctions against perpetrator corporations
engaged in a pattern of illicit activity.2 33 The rule is also incon-
sistent with the "association-in-fact" theory of enterprise com-
monly used in organized crime prosecutions.2 3 Finally, the
distinction is vulnerable to clever pleading tactics by plain-
1962(c), which clearly envisions two entities [and such a distinction] comports
with legislative intent and policy.").
229. Bennett 770 F.2d at 315.
230. Id. ("Such a distinction focuses the section on the culpable party and
recognizes that the enterprise itself is often a passive instrument or victim of
the racketeering activity.").
231. See Schofield, 793 F.2d at 31 (noting judicial split as to § 1962(a)).
Compare Medallion T.V. Enters. v. SelecTV, 627 F. Supp. 1290, 1294-95 (C.D.
Cal. 1986) (requiring distinction for § 1962(b)) with Commonwealth v. Derry
Constr., 617 F. Supp. 940, 942-44 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (rejecting distinction for
§ 1962(b)).
232. See Bender v. Southland Corp., 749 F.2d 1205, 1216 (6th Cir. 1984) (dis-
cussing elements of fraud and stressing intent requirement); Pandick, Inc. v.
Rooney, 632 F. Supp. 1430, 1434 (N.D. IM. 1986) ("[w]illfulness" an important
element in RICO action); Kronfeld v. First Jersey Nat'l Bank, 638 F. Supp.
1454, 1470 (D.N.J. 1986) (requisite mens rea is specific intent to defraud).
233. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 374-77. Logically, for ex-
ample, if a corporation is engaged in massive fraud, it would be immune to
both civil and criminal RICO proceedings. See United States v. Standard Dry-
wall Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1283, 1292-94 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (corporation cannot be
defendant and one of a group constituting enterprise). This may explain why
the distinction has been occasionally rejected in the criminal context-
notwithstanding identical statutory language for both criminal and civil viola-
tions. See United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 988 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983); see also Fustok v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 618
F. Supp. 1074, 1075-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (corporate defendant part of association-
in-fact enterprise).
234. See supra note 22 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982)). Virtually every
Mafia prosecution involves an association-in-fact enterprise. See United States
v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986) (RICO prosecution of New York Mafia
bosses); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1222 (9th Cir. 1982) (RICO
prosecution against members of La Cosa Nostra); United States v. Gotti, 641 F.
Supp. 283, 286 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (prosecution of Gambino crime family); Senate
RICO Hearings, supra note 5, at 109-10 (summary of recent mob prosecutions).
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tiffs. 235 It is, therefore, not a distinction that could have been
intended.
The application of respondeat superior principles to civil
RICO also is sound policy. The Supreme Court has recognized
that the possibility of respondeat superior liability motivates
principals to supervise their agents more rigorously.236 Deter-
rence is thus advanced. The concern that victim enterprises
may then be exposed to undeserved liability23 7 is fundamen-
tally misplaced. Absent an intent to benefit the principal, re-
spondeat superior liability is not imposed.238 Furthermore, as
between innocent victims and a principal with supervisory re-
sponsibility, fairness mandates imposing the risk of loss on the
latter.23 9 Finally, given the proposed reduction to double dam-
age liability, concern about overly harsh, punitive results
should be dismissed.
Despite the propriety of applying respondeat superior to
civil RICO, the proposed amendment adopts a limited remedy.
This, too, is purely a compromise designed to make RICO less
threatening to institutional businesses. Under the proposal, re-
spondeat superior liability is preserved for actual damages. Lia-
bility for double damages is limited to situations in which the
principal is directly, rather than vicariously, at fault. Because
the proposal was derived from the Model Penal Code's stan-
dard for corporate criminality,240 it should easily suffice for
civil liability.
H.R. 5445 Comparison: H.R. 5445 contains no comparable
respondeat superior provision. The matter is covered, however,
by Congressman Boucher's "extension of remarks." 24 ' Once
again, the effect of his statement is disingenuous. Congressman
Boucher first reviews and endorses prevailing case law re-
jecting respondeat superior liability for civil RICO.242 He then
indicates that, rather than address this issue legislatively, the
drafters were "content... to allow the current trend in the law
235. See Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1059-60 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting how
to plead around distinction); Cumulative Decision Index, 4 RICO L. REP. 24,
31 (1986) (citing cases pleading around distinction).
236. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 144 & 230 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 227.
239. See supra notes 138.40 and accompanying text.
240. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
241. See supra text accompanying note 192.
242. See 132 CONG. REC. E3533-34 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1986) (statement of
Rep. Boucher).
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to continue without congressional action. '243 Because present
RICO law generally rejects respondeat superior,244 Congress-
man Boucher obviously seeks to legislate indirectly a result he
could not achieve directly. The original version of H.R. 5445
contained restrictive respondeat superior language that was se-
verely criticized. 24 5 That approach, which was not adopted in
the substitute bill, should not be resurrected. Although Con-
gressman Boucher's legislative history accurately cites case law,
the judiciary is likely to view respondeat superior more sensi-
bly once RICO has been moderated.
24 6
7. Providing a Limitations Period
Title 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) is amended to read as follows:
(3) All actions arising under this subsection must be filed
within three years of either accrual of the cause of action or
the last act causing injury, whichever is later; provided,
however, that the limitations period is tolled during the
pendency of any related government civil action or crimi-
nal prosecution.
COMMENT
RICO presently lacks a specified limitations period. To
avoid the prospect of litigating stale claims, an express limita-
tions period is proposed. This provision also adds an important
element of certainty to RICO litigation. Absent a specified pe-
riod, federal courts generally resolve this issue by selecting the
closest analogous state limitations statute.247 Courts have dif-
fered widely, however, in their statutory selections.248 More-
over, because state limitations periods also vary widely,
similarity of conduct does not necessarily ensure similar limita-
tions treatment in different states.249 The proposed amend-
243. Id. at E3534.
244. See supra notes 143 & 221 and accompanying text.
245. See Appendix; see also Celebrezze, Keep RICO Intact- It's Working
Well, Legal Times, Oct. 6, 1986, at 17, col. 1 (criticizing the original H.R. 5445).
246. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
247. See, e.g., Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[F]ederal
courts have looked to the law of their forum state for an appropriate civil limi-
tation period."); A.B. Alexander v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 729 F.2d 576, 577 (8th
Cir. 1984) ("When a federal statute creates a cause of action, but fails to in-
clude a statute of limitations, the federal courts usually apply the most analo-
gous state statute of limitations."); Note, A Uniform Limitations Period for
Civil RICO, 61 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 495, 495 (1986).
248. Note, supra note 247, at 495-97.
249. For example, if a state RICO law contains a limitations period, it is
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ment therefore promotes uniformity as well as certainty.
A three-year limitations period is proposed. This is one
year less than the period presently authorized in analogous en-
forcement areas such as antitrust.250 Note that the period does
not begin to run until termination of the last act causing injury.
Because a potential plaintiff has not been injured under RICO
until the pattern element has been satisfied, it is inappropriate
to start the limitations period before the pattern is fully devel-
oped. The amendment rejects both case law and legislative pro-
posals to the contrary.25 1
Accrual of an action is left undefined in the proposed
amendment. Established federal time bar principles are, how-
ever, applicable. Sometimes, an action may not accrue until
well after the last act causing injury. For example, a fraud ac-
tion does not accrue until the actor knows or has reason to
know of his injury.25 2 The limitations period should not be trig-
gered before this occurrence.
The proposal also allows for flexibility during the pen-
dency of related government actions. When a criminal action
has been filed, procedural complexities often preclude concomi-
tant civil proceedings. 253 Governmental civil action may also
make private litigation impractical. Accordingly, the limita-
tions period is expressly tolled during such periods. Other toll-
ing principles also are generally applicable.
H.R. 5445 Comparison: The proposed reform essentially
the most analogous state statute. See Delta Coal Program v. Libman, 554 F.
Supp. 684, 690 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1982). Not all state RICO laws, however, contain
limitations periods, and those that do vary considerably. See ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-2314(H) (Supp. 1985) (7 years); FLA. STAT. § 895.05(10) (Supp. 1986)
(5 years); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:41-4 (West 1982) (unspecified).
250. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1982).
251. See Bowling v. Founders Title Co., 773 F.2d 1175, 1178 (11th Cir. 1985)
(RICO claim time barred without inquiry as to whether plaintiff had knowl-
edge of pattern); Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th Cir. 1984) (limita-
tions period begins to run when plaintiff knows of injury, not end of
defendant's conduct); supra note 95 and accompanying text (citing bill propos-
ing restrictive limitations period). But see County of Cook v. Berger, 648 F.
Supp. 433, 434-35 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (applying "last overt act" conspiracy doctrine,
reasoning that "it would be incongruous to bar, on statute of limitations
grounds, recovery for predicate acts taking place outside the limitations period
and permitting recovery only for those within the limitations periods." Id at
435).
252. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122 (1979); Bailey v. Glover,
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349-50 (1874); Bowling, 773 F.2d at 1178.
253. See generally Project, White-Collar Crime: Third Annual Survey of
Law, 22 AmI CRM . L. REV. 279, 613-30 (reviewing procedural complexities of
parallel criminal and civil proceedings).
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adopts the approach suggested in H.R. 5445. Although the
House bill provided for a two-year postconviction limitations
period, the absence of a prior conviction component to the pro-
posed reform negates the need for such a provision.
8. Pleading Requirements
Title 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) is amended to read as follows:
(4) In all actions arising under this subsection, the ele-
ments of each claim must be averred with particularity
against each defendant.
COMMENT
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires
that "[i]n all averments of fraud.., the circumstances consti-
tuting fraud... shall be stated with particularity." 254 This pro-
vision is intended to guard against strike suits and ensure
adequate notice of a claim.255 It frequently has been used to
dismiss fraud-based RICO claims lacking factual foundation.256
The rule, however, has significant limitations. First, because
the particularity principle is inconsistent with the prevailing
doctrine of "notice pleading," some courts have been reluctant
to require specificity in fraud pleadings.257 As a result, particu-
larity as to each defendant has not always been required.258
Second, the rule generally is not extended to each element of a
RICO claim. For example, notwithstanding the centrality of
the enterprise concept to every RICO claim, Rule 9(b) does not
apply to this element.25 9 Finally, the rule does not apply to
254. FED. R. Crv. P. 9(b).
255. See United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1385 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) ("The rule serves to discourage the initiation of suits brought solely
for their nuisance value, and safeguards potential defendants from frivolous
accusations of moral turpitude." (footnotes omitted)); Segal v. Gordon, 467
F.2d 602, 607 (2d Cir. 1972) (discussing policies underlying the Rule); 5 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1296, at 399-400
(1969).
256. Goldsmith & Keith, supra note 16, at 88-92 (citing case law).
257. See, e.g., Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742
F.2d 786, 791 (3d Cir. 1984) (admonishing against applying "too strict a scru-
tiny" to pleadings alleging fraud); In re Longhorn Sec. Litig., 573 F. Supp. 255,
264 (W.D. Okla. 1983) (pleadings need not be extremely specific because the
number of suits filed demonstrates that they are not frivolous and that the de-
fendant had ample notice).
258. See cases cited supra note 257.
259. Many courts have thus held that the structure of the RICO enterprise
need not be delineated. See Seville Indus. Mach., 742 F.2d at 790 (federal rules
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nonfraud RICO cases.260
The proposed amendment addresses each of these con-
cerns. It overrides the doctrine of "notice pleading," explicitly
applies to each element and each defendant, and includes non-
fraud predicates within its scope. Absent highly unusual cir-
cumstances, exceptions to this requirement should be
disfavored. The amendment will thus provide defendants with
further protection against groundless suits.
H.R. 5445 Comparison: The proposal is based on a compa-
rable provision contained in H.R. 5445, which amends Rule 9(b)
to provide that "[i]n an action under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), facts
supporting the claim against each defendant shall be averred
with particularity. ' 261 This provision is, however, ambiguous in
two critical respects. First, it is unclear whether it is limited to
fraud predicates. Because Rule 9(b) is principally concerned
with fraud claims, nonfraud predicates appear to be excluded.
Congressman Boucher's legislative history, however, suggests a
contrary intention.262 Second, it is unclear whether the re-
quirement extends to every RICO element. The text does not
definitively answer this question but Congressman Boucher's
remarks once again suggest an affirmative response.263 To fa-
cilitate compromise, the proposed amendment resolves these is-
sues in favor of RICO defendants.
9. Enhanced Sanctions for Frivolous Suits
Title 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) is amended to read as follows:
(5) In any action arising under this subsection, the court
may impose a double damage penalty for counsel fees and
costs incurred as a result of litigation filed in violation of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. In any proceeding re-
sulting in dismissal or summary judgment against a RICO
claimant, the court shall require affidavits or conduct a
hearing to determine compliance with Rule 11.
COMMENT
In 1983, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
designed to allow liberal pleadings and this much specificity not needed);
Schnitzer v. Oppenheimer & Co., 633 F. Supp. 92, 97-98 (D. Or. 1985).
260. By its terms, Rule 9(b) only applies to fraud. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
261. See Appendix.
262. See 132 CONG. REc. E3533 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Boucher).
263. 1d&
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was amended to impose on claimant's counsel an affirmative
duty of "reasonable inquiry.''264 Monetary sanctions were spe-
cifically authorized for noncompliance with the rule.265 Re-
cently, Rule 11 has been used aggressively to penalize RICO
litigants pursuing claims that lack factual or legal basis.266 The
proposed amendment seeks to strengthen the application of
this rule in RICO cases by authorizing imposition of double
counsel fees and costs against violators. The possibility of se-
vere sanctions, coupled with the proposed procedural changes
that would make RICO claims more difficult to assert,267
should serve as an adequate disincentive against frivolous
filings.
The imposition of double damages is, however, discretion-
ary. Should the court decide that less severe sanctions are ap-
propriate, its order may be modified accordingly. This
discretionary feature is adopted because of concern that a se-
vere mandatory sanction might deter findings of Rule 11
violations.
The second sentence of this provision mandates Rule 11 af-
fidavits or a hearing whenever a RICO claim has been either
dismissed or eliminated through summary judgment. The in-
tended purpose is to direct the court to serve a policing func-
tion in such circumstances. Because plaintiffs will be on notice
that failure to establish a prima facie case will effect an auto-
matic Rule 11 inquiry, frivolous filings should diminish. In-
deed, the proposed amendment should prompt conscientious
counsel to document compliance before initiating litigation.
H.R. 5445 Comparison: There is no comparable provision
in H.R. 5445. The proposed text, therefore, provides an added
safeguard against inappropriate filings.
264. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
265. See supra note 52. The developments leading to the 1983 amendments
are reviewed in 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 255, § 1332, at 164-66
(Supp. 1986).
266. See Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359-60 (5th Cir.
1986) (plaintiff's pro se status no shield against sanctions for manifestly and
patently frivolous claims); Southern Leasing Partners, Ltd. v. McMullan, 801
F.2d 783, 787-89 (5th Cir. 1986) (reasonable inquiry would have discovered that
plaintiffs complaint was barred by res judicata); Ginther v. Texas Commerce
Bank, 111 F.R.D. 615, 627-28 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (sanctions imposed where frivo-
lous complaint prosecuted in bad faith and in violation of court order); Thiel v.
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 646 F. Supp. 592, 597-98 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (sanc-
tions warranted where plaintiffs brought frivolous action); Goldsmith & Keith,
supra note 16, at 94-96 (citing case law).
267. See supra notes 165-85 & 195-204 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The legislative debate over civil RICO has produced pro-
posals designed to eviscerate the remedy rather than rectify
specific problem areas. Because such proposals would broadly
protect white collar institutions from deserved civil liability for
criminal wrongs, this result should not be tolerated. As our an-
titrust and securities laws have prevailed against institutional
critics, civil RICO should also be permitted to thrive. H.R.
5445, although a compromise of sorts, barely permits survival.
Civil RICO reform responsively tailored to legitimate criticism
is, however, possible. Whether it will be accomplished depends
on Congress's willingness to alter the terms of the present
debate.
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APPENDIX
99th Congress, 1st Session: S.1521
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
JULY 29 (legislative day, JULY 16), 1985
Mr. HATCH introduced the following bill; which was read twice
and referred to
the Committee on the Judiciary
A Bill
To clarify the intent of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act with respect to private civil actions.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That sub-
section (c) of section 1964 of title 18, United States Code, is
amended to read as follows:
"(c)(1) Any person suffering competitive, investment, or
other business injury as a result of a violation of section 1962 of
this chapter involving a pattern of racketeering activity may
sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and
shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of
the suit, including reasonable attorney's fees.
"(2) For purposes of this subsection, 'pattern of racketeer-
ing activity' shall require that at least one act of racketeering
activity shall be an act of racketeering activity other than-
"(i) an act indictable under section 1341 of title 18,
United States Code;
"(ii) an act indictable under section 1343 of title 18,
United States Code; or
"(iii) an act which is an offense involving fraud in the
sale of securities.
"(3) If the court determines that a suit brought under this
subsection was frivolous and without merit, the court may, at
its discretion, award the cost of the suit including reasonable at-
torney's fees to the defendant.".
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99th Congress, 1st Session: H.R. 2517
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MAY 15, 1985
Mr. CONYERS introduced the following bill; which was referred
to the Committee
on the Judiciary
A Bill
To amend chapter 96 of title 18, United States Code.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION
1. DEFINITIONAL AMENDMENTS.
Section 1961 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking out "racketeering"
and inserting "predicate criminal" in lieu thereof;
(2) so that paragraph (4) reads as follows:
"(4) 'enterprise' means a business or other similar
business-like undertaking by an association of persons,
whether organized for legitimate or illegitimate purposes,
and includes a government or government agency;";
(3) so that paragraph (5) reads as follows:
"(5) 'pattern of criminal activity' means two or more
acts of predicate criminal activity, separate in time and
place-
"(A) each of which occurred not more than five
years before the indictment is found, or information is
instituted, that names such acts as predicate criminal
activity;
"(B) all of which are not violations of the same
provision of law, if that provision of law is-
"(i) the second undesignated paragraph of
section 2314 (relating to the transportation of sto-
len goods, securities, moneys, fraudulent State tax
stamps, or articles used in counterfeiting) of this
title;
"(ii) section 1341 (relating to mail fraud) of
this title; or
"(iii) section 1342 (relating to wire fraud) of
this title; and
"(C) that are interrelated by a common scheme,
plan, or motive, and are not isolated events;";
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(4) by striking out "and" at the end of paragraph (9);
(5) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (10)
and inserting "; and" in lieu thereof; and
(6) by adding at the end the following:
"(11) 'criminal syndicate' means an enterprise of five or
more persons, a significant purpose of which is to engage on a
continuing basis in a pattern of criminal activity, other than a
pattern of criminal activity consisting solely of conduct consti-
tuting a felony under section 1084 of this title or under the law
of a State relating to engaging in a gambling business.".
SEC. 2. OFFENSE AMENDMENTS.
Section 1962 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-
(1) by inserting after the heading of such section the
following new subsection:
"(a) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to
organize, own, control, finance, or otherwise participate in
a supervisory capacity in a criminal syndicate.";
(2) by redesignating subsections (a), (b), and (c) as
subsections (b), (c), and (d), respectively;
(3) in the subsection redesignated as subsection (b) by
paragraph (2)-
(A) by striking out "racketeering activity" each
place it appears and inserting "criminal activity" in
lieu thereof; and
(B) by inserting "knowingly" before "to use or
invest";
(4) in the subsection redesignated as subsection (c) by
paragraph (2)-
(A) by striking out "racketeering activity" and
inserting "criminal activity" in lieu thereof; and
(B) by inserting "knowingly" before "to acquire
or maintain";
(5) in the subsection redesignated as subsection (d)
by paragraph (2)-
(A) by striking out "racketeering activity" and
inserting "criminal activity" in lieu thereof; and
(B) by inserting "knowingly" before "to conduct
or participate"; and
(6) by striking out the subsection designated (d) with-
out regard to the redesignations made by paragraph (2).
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SEC. 3. SECTION 1963 AMENDMENTS.
Section 1963(a) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended-
(1) by striking out "any provision of section 1962 of
this chapter" and inserting "section 1962" in lieu thereof;
(2) by inserting "in the case of a violation of a subsec-
tion other than subsection (a) of such section" after "shall"
the first place it appears; and
(3) by inserting "and in the case of a violation of sub-
section (a) of such section be fined not more than $250,000
or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both," after "or
both,".
SEC. 4. CLERICAL AMENDMENTS.
(a) HEADING FOR CHAPTER.-The heading of chapter 96 of
title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking out
"RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZA-
TIONS" and inserting "CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES AND
CORRUPTION OF ENTERPRISES" in lieu thereof.
(b) TABLE OF CHAPTER.-The table of chapters at the be-
ginning of part I of title 18, United States Code, is amended so
that the item relating to chapter 96 is amended to read as
follows:
"96. Criminal enterprises and corruption of enterprises
... 1961".
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99th Congress, 1st Session: H.R. 2943
IN THE HOUSE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES
JULY 10, 1985
Mr. BOUCHER (for himself, Mr. Fish, Mr. Gekas, and Mr.
Hyde) introduced the
following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary
A Bill
To amend section 1964 of title 18, United States Code, with
respect to certain civil remedies for persons injured
by racketeering activity.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That sec-
tion 1964(c) of title 18, United States Code, is amended-
(1) by striking out "a violation" and inserting "con-
duct in violation" in lieu thereof;
(2) by striking out "therefor" and inserting "any per-
son who engaged in that conduct and, with respect to such
conduct, was convicted of racketeering activity or of a vio-
lation of section 1962" in lieu thereof;
(3) by inserting a comma after "district court"; and
(4) by adding at the end the following: "A civil action
under this subsection may not be commenced against a de-
fendant later than one year after the entry of the latest
judgment of conviction against the defendant for racketeer-
ing activity or a violation of section 1962 with respect to the
conduct out of which such action arises.".
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99th Congress, 1st Session: H.R. 3985
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
DECEMBER 18, 1985
Mr. CONYERS introduced the following bill; which was referred
to the Committee
on the Judiciary
A Bill
To amend chapter 96 of title 18, United States Code.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "RICO Amendments Act of
1985".
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONAL AMENDMENTS.
Section 1961 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in paragraph (1)(B)-
(A) by striking out "section 1341" and all that
follows through "wire fraud)"; and
(B) by striking out "sections 2134 and" and in-
serting "section" in lieu thereof;
(2) in paragraph (1)(D), by striking out ", fraud in
the sale of securities,"; and
(3) in paragraph (5)-
(A) by inserting "or fraudulent" after "racke-
teering" each place it appears;
(B) by inserting before the semicolon at the end
the following: "that-
"(A) are related to the affairs of an enterprise;
"(B) are not isolated; and
"(C) are not so closely related to each other and
connected in point of time and place that, while having
multiple bases of jurisdiction, including use of the
mails, wire communications, or interstate travel or
transportation, they constitute a single transaction, in-
volving only one victim, not evincing continuity of ac-
tivity;
1987]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
(4) in each of paragraphs (7) and (8), by inserting "or
fraud" after "racketeering" each place it appears;
(5) by striking out "and" at the end of paragraph (9);
(6) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph
(10) and inserting "; and" in lieu thereof; and
(7) by adding at the end the following:
"(11) 'fraudulent activity' means-
(A) any act which is indictable under any of sec-
tions 1341 (relating to mail fraud), 1343 (relating to
wire fraud) and 2314 (relating to interstate transporta-
tion of stolen property) of this title; or
"(B) any offense involving fraud under section 24
of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77x), section 32
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78ff),
section 29 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935 (15 U.S.C. 79z-3), section 325 of the Trust In-
denture Act of 1939 (15 U.S.C. 77yyy), section 49 of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-48),
section 217 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15
U.S.C. 80b-17) or section 9 of the Commodity Exchange
Act (7 U.S.C. 13).".
SEC. 3. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES AMENDMENTS.
Section 1962 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-
(1) 'by inserting "or fraudulent" after "racketeering"
each place it appears;
(2) in subsection (a), by inserting "knowingly" before
"to use or invest";
(3) in subsection (b), by inserting "knowingly" before
"to acquire or maintain"; and
(4) in subsection (c), by inserting "knowingly" before
"to conduct or participate".
SEC. 4. CRIMINAL PENALTIES AMENDMENT.
Section 1963(a)(3) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended by inserting "or fraudulent" after "racketeering".
SEC. 5. CIVIL INVESTIGATIVE DEMAND AMENDMENT.
Section 1968 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
inserting "or fraud" after "racketeering" each place it appears.
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99th Congress, 2d Session: H.R. 4892
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MAY 22, 1986
Mr. FRANK introduced the following bill; which was referred
to the Committee on the Judiciary
A Bill
To amend title 9 and 18 of the United States Code with respect
to certain civil proceedings arising under chapter 96 of title 18
of the United States Code.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Civil RICO Amendments Act
of 1986".
SEC. 2. ARBITRATION AMENDMENT.
Section 2 of title 9, United States Code, is amended by ad-
ding at the end "Any claim arising under section 1964(c) of title
18 and based solely upon fraudulent activity of the party
against whom the claim is made is subject to settlement by ar-
bitration under this chapter, and a substantially prevailing
claimant in such arbitration or in a prior or later related judi-
cial proceeding on such claim shall be awarded costs of the pro-
ceeding, including a reasonable attorney's fee.".
SEC. 3. SECTION 1961 AMENDMENTS.
Section 1961 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in paragraph (1)(A), by inserting after "obscene
matter," the following: "prostitution involving minors,";
(2) in paragraph (1)(B)-
(A) by striking out "section 1341" and all that
follows through "wire fraud)";
(B) by striking out "sections 2314 and" and in-
serting "section" in lieu thereof; and
(C) by inserting after "white slave traffic)" the
following: "chapter 51 (relating to homicide), chapter
73 (relating to obstruction of justice), chapter 110 (re-
lating to sexual exploitation of children), section 32
(relating to destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities),
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section 112 (relating to protection of foreign officials),
section 115 (relating to assaults against a Federal offi-
cial's family), section 215 (relating to bank bribery),
section 373 (relating to solicitation to commit a crime
of violence), section 510 (relating to fraud on Treasury
paper or other United States securities), section 511
(relating to forgery of State and other securities), sec-
tion 666 (relating to theft or bribery in benefit pro-
grams), section 844 (relating to explosive materials),
sections 1029 and 1030 (relating to fraud in connection
with access devices and computers), section 1203 (relat-
ing to hostage taking), section 1344 (relating to bank
fraud), section 1952A (relating to murder-for-hire), sec-
tion 1952B (relating to violent crime in aid of racke-
teering), and sections 2318 and 2320 (relating to
counterfeit materials);";
(3) in paragraph (1), by adding at the end of the para-
graph the following:
"(F) a criminal violation of the Securities Act of 1933, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940, and the Commodity Exchange
Act, or (G) an offense under the Controlled Substances Act or
the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act;";
(4) in paragraph (5)-
(A) by inserting "or fraudulent" after "racke-
teering" each place it appears; and
(B) by inserting before the semicolon at the end
the following: "that-
"(A) are related to the affairs of an enterprise;
"(B) are not isolated; and
"(C) are not so closely related to each other and
connected in point of time and place that, while having
multiple bases of jurisdiction, including use of the
mails, wire communications, or interstate travel or
transportation, they constitute a single transaction, in-
volving only one victim, not evincing continuity of ac-
tivity;
(5) in each of paragraphs (7) and (8), by inserting "or
fraud" after "racketeering" each place it appears;
(6) by striking out "and" at the end of paragraph (9);
(7) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph
(10) and inserting "; and" in lieu thereof; and
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(8) by adding at the end the following:
"(11) 'fraudulent activity' means-
(A) any act which is indictable under any of sec-
tions 1341 (relating to mail fraud), 1343 (relating to
wire fraud), and 2314 (relating to interstate transporta-
tion of stolen property) of this title; or
"(B) an offense involving fraud connected with a
case under title 11 or fraud in the sale of securities.".
SEC. 4. SECTION 1962 AMENDMENT.
Section 1962 of title 189, United States Code, is amended by
inserting "or fraudulent" after "racketeering" each place it
appears.
SEC. 5. SECTION 1963 AMENDMENT.
Section 1963(a)(3) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended by inserting "or fraudulent" after "racketeering".
SEC. 6. SECTION 1964 AMENDMENTS.
(a) Section 1964(a) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended-
(1) by striking out "(a)" and inserting in lieu thereof
"(a)(1)"; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
"(2) Any person may institute proceedings under this sub-
section. In any proceeding brought by any person under this
subsection relief shall be granted in conformity with the princi-
ples which govern the granting of injunctive relief from
threatened loss or damage in other cases, including the possibil-
ity that any judgment for money damages might be difficult to
execute, but no showing of special or irreparable injury shall
have to be made. Upon the execution of such bond against
damages for an injunction improvidently granted as the court
determines proper a temporary restraining order and a prelimi-
nary injunction may be issued in any action or proceeding
before a final determination thereof upon its merits. Such un-
dertaking shall not be required when the applicant is a State or
territory of the United States. Recovery if the person substan-
tially prevails shall include the costs of the action, including a
reasonable attorney's fee in the trial and appellate courts.".
(b) Section 1964(c) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended to read as follows:
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"(c)(1) Any person who is, directly or indirectly, injured,
by reason of any violation of section 1962 of this chapter may
bring a civil action in an appropriate district court of the United
States and shall recover threefold the actual damages sustained
by him, and if the person substantially prevails, the costs of the
action, including a reasonable attorney's fee in the trial and ap-
pellate courts. Damage shall not include pain and suffering.
"(2) If the court determines that the filing of any plead-
ing, motion, or paper under this subsection is frivolous or that
any action or proceeding is brought or continued under this
subsection in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for an im-
proper or oppressive reason, the court shall award actual costs
of the action or proceeding, including attorney's fees, unless the
court finds that special circumstances, including the relative
economic position of the parties, make such an award unjust.
"(3) Whenever the United States is, directly or indirectly,
injured in its business or property by reason of any violation of
section 1962 of this chapter, the Attorney General may bring a
civil action in an appropriate district court of the United States
and shall recover threefold the actual damages sustained by it,
and the cost, including investigations and litigation, of the
action.
"(4) Any attorney general of a State may bring an action
or proceeding under this subsection in the name of the State, as
parens patriae on behalf of individuals residing in such State, in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
defendant, to secure monetary relief as provided in this section
for injury sustained by such individuals by reason of any viola-
tion of section 1962 of this title. The court shall exclude from
the amount of monetary relief awarded in the action or pro-
ceeding any amount of monetary relief that duplicates amounts
which have been awarded for the same claim or which is prop-
erly allocable to individuals who have excluded their claims
pursuant to this paragraph and to any business entity. The
court shall award the State as monetary relief threefold the to-
tal damage sustained as described in this paragraph, and the
cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. In any action
or proceeding brought under this paragraph, the State attorney
general shall, at such times, in such manner, and with such con-
tent as the court may direct, cause notice of such action or pro-
ceeding to be given by publication. If the court finds that notice
given solely by publication would deny due process of law to
any person, the court may direct further notice to such person
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according to the circumstances of the case. Any person on
whose behalf an action or proceeding is brought under this par-
agraph may elect to exclude from adjudication the portion of
the State claim for monetary or other relief attributable to such
person by filing notice of such election with the court within
such time as specified in the notice given under this paragraph.
An action or proceeding under this paragraph shall not be dis-
missed or compromised without the approval of the court, and
notice of any proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given
in such manner as the court directs. In any action or proceed-
ing under this subsection-
"(A) the amount of the plaintiff's attorney's fee, if
any, shall be determined by the court; and
"(B) the court may in its discretion, award a reason-
able attorney's fee to a prevailing defendant upon a finding
that the State attorney general has acted in bad faith, frivo-
lously, vexatiously, wantonly, or for an improper or oppres-
sive reason.
"(5) Notwithstanding any other provision of law provid-
ing a shorter period of limitation, any civil action or proceeding
under this subsection may be commenced at any time within
four years after the unlawful conduct terminates or the cause
of action accrues, whichever is later. Whenever any civil, crimi-
nal, or other action or proceeding is brought or intervened in by
the United States to prevent, restrain, or punish any violation
of section 1962 of this chapter, the running of the period of lim-
itation prescribed by this paragraph with respect to any cause
of action arising under this subsection which is based in whole
or in part on any matter complained of in such action or pro-
ceeding by the United States, shall be suspended during the
pendency of such action or proceeding by the United States and
for two years thereafter.".
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99th Congress, 2d Session: H.R. 5290
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JULY 30, 1986
Mr. RODINO introduced the following bill; which was referred
to the Committee
on the Judiciary
A Bill
To amend chapter 96 of title 18, United States Code.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. CHAPTER 96 HEADING AMENDMENT.
The heading for chapter 96 of title 18, United States Code,
is amended by striking out "RACKETEER INFLUENCED
AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS" and inserting in lieu
thereof "PATTERN OF ILLICIT ACTIVITY".
SEC. 2. SECTION 1961 AMENDMENTS.
Section 1961 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking out "racketeering"
the first place it appears and inserting "illicit" in lieu
thereof;
(2) in paragraph (5), by striking out "racketeering"
each place it appears and inserting "illicit" in lieu thereof;
(3) in paragraph (7), by striking out "racketeering"
each place it appears and inserting "criminal" in lieu
thereof; and
(4) in paragraph (8)-
(A) by striking out "racketeering" the first place
it appears and inserting "illicit activity" in lieu thereof;
and
(B) by striking out "racketeering" the second
place it appears and inserting "criminal" in lieu
thereof.
SEC. 3. SECTION 1962 AMENDMENTS.
Section 1962 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
striking out "racketeering" each place it appears and inserting
"illicit" in lieu thereof.
[Vol. 71:827
RICO REFORM
SEC. 4. SECTION 1963 AMENDMENT.
Paragraph (3) of section 1963(a) of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by striking out "racketeering" and inserting
"illicit" in lieu thereof.
SEC. 5. SECTION 1964 AMENDMENT.
Subsection (c) of section 1964 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows:
"(c)(1) Any person or government whose business or
property is injured by conduct in violation of section 1962 of
this title may bring a civil action for the recoverable damages
such person or government sustains, against-
"(A) an individual; or
"(B) a person other than an individual, if such con-
duct is-
"(i) authorized by an individual with the policy-
making authority to determine the manner in which
the essential functions of such person other than an in-
dividual are conducted, and
"(ii) intended materially to benefit such person
other than an individual.
"(2) As used in paragraph (1) of this subsection, the term
'recoverable damages' means-
"(A) actual damages; and
"(B) if the court finds actual malice on the part of
the defendant, punitive damages in an amount not to ex-
ceed twice the actual damages.
"(3) An action under this subsection must be commenced
not later than two years after the accrual of the cause of action.
"(4) In an action under this subsection-
"(A) the court shall award a prevailing plaintiff a
reasonable attorney's fee; and
"(B) the plaintiff must establish that the acts of illicit
activity constituting the pattern of illicit activity-
"(i) are related to the affairs of the organization;
"(ii) are not isolated acts;
"(iii) are not so closely related to each other and
connected in time and place that they constitute a sin-
gle transaction; and
"(iv) all occurred within five years of the most
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recent act of illicit activity that is part of the pattern of
illicit activity.
"(5)(A) The Court may award in a civil action under this
subsection, upon a motion promptly made by a prevailing plain-
tiff, simple interest on the actual damages for the period begin-
ning on the date of service of such plaintiff's complaint alleging
a cause of action under this subsection and ending on the date
of judgment, or for any shorter period therein, if the court
finds that such award is just in the circumstances.
"(B) In determining whether such award is just in the cir-
cumstances, the court shall consider only whether in the course
of the action such plaintiff or the opposing party, or a represen-
tative of either-
"(i) made motions or asserted claims or defenses so
lacking in merit as to show that such party or representa-
tive acted intentionally for delay, or otherwise acted in bad
faith;
"(ii) violated any applicable statute, rule, or court or-
der providing for sanctions for dilatory behavior or other-
wise providing for expeditious proceedings; and
"(iii) engaged in conduct primarily for the purpose of
delaying the litigation or increasing the cost thereof.
"(6) The United States district courts shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction of civil actions under this subsection."
SEC. 6. SECTION 1968 AMENDMENT.
Section 1968 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in subsection (a), by striking out "a racketeering
investigation" and inserting "an illicit activity investiga-
tion" in lieu thereof;
(2) in subsection (b), by striking out "racketeering"
each place it appears and inserting "illicit activity" in lieu
thereof;
(3) in subsection (c), by striking out "racketeering"
each place it appears and inserting "illicit activity" in lieu
thereof; and
(4) in subsection (f)-
(A) by striking out "racketeering" the first and
fifth place it appears and inserting "criminal" in lieu
thereof; and
(B) by striking out "racketeering" each other
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place it appears and inserting "illicit activity" in lieu
thereof.
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99th Congress, 2d Session: H.R. 5391
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AUGUST 12, 1986
Mr. CONYERS introduced the following bill; which was referred
to the Committee
on the Judiciary
A Bill
To amend chapter 96 of title 18, United States Code.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. CHAPTER 96 HEADING AMENDMENT.
The heading for chapter 96 of title 18, United States Code,
is amended by striking out "RACKETEER INFLUENCED
AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS" and inserting in lieu
thereof "PATTERN OF ILLICIT ACTIVITY".
SEC. 2. SECTION 1961 AMENDMENTS.
Section 1961 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking out "racketeering"
the first place it appears and inserting "illicit" in lieu
thereof;
(2) in paragraph (5), by striking out "racketeering"
each place it appears and inserting "illicit" in lieu thereof;
(3) in paragraph (7), by striking out "racketeering"
each place it appears and inserting "criminal" in lieu
thereof; and
(4) in paragraph (8)-
(A) by striking out "racketeering" the first place
it appears and inserting "illicit activity" in lieu thereof;
and
(B) by striking out "racketeering" the second
place it appears and inserting "criminal" in lieu
thereof.
SEC. 3. SECTION 1962 AMENDMENTS.
Section 1962 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
striking out "racketeering" each place it appears and inserting
"illicit" in lieu thereof.
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SEC. 4. SECTION 1963 AMENDMENT.
Paragraph (3) of section 1963(a) of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by striking out "racketeering" and inserting
"illicit" in lieu thereof.
SEC. 5. SECTION 1964 AMENDMENT.
Subsection (c) of section 1964 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows:
"(c)(1) Any person or government whose business or
property is injured by conduct in violation of section 1962 of
this title may obtain the recoverable damages such person or
government sustains in a civil action against-
"(A) an individual; or
"(B) a person other than an individual, if such con-
duct is authorized, ratified, performed, or recklessly toler-
ated by the board of directors, a high management agent,
or a similar individual or agent.
"(2) As used in paragraph (1) of this subsection-
"(A) the term 'high management agent', with respect
to a person other than an individual, includes-
"(i) an executive officer or other officer or agent
in a position of comparable authority with respect to
the formulation of such person's policy or the supervi-
sion in a managerial capacity of subordinate employees
or agents;
"(ii) any individual, whether or not an officer of
such person, who controls such person or is respon-
sibly involved in formulating such person's policy; and
"(iii) any other individual for whose conduct a
law exists that provides such person is responsible;
and
"(B) the term 'recoverable damages' means-
"(i) in the case of a civil action commenced by a
government to obtain damages sustained by that gov-
ernment, threefold the damages sustained; and
"(ii) in any other case-
"(I) actual damages; and
"(II) if the finder of fact finds actual malice
on the part of the defendant, punitive damages in
an amount not to exceed twice the actual damages.
"(3) An action under this subsection must be com-
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menced not later than four years after the conduct out of
which the action arose.
"(4) In an action under this subsection-
"(A) the court shall award a prevailing plaintiff a
reasonable attorney's fee; and
"(B) the plaintiff must establish that the acts of
illicit activity constituting the pattern of illicit activ-
ity-
"(i) are not isolated acts;
"(ii) are not so closely related to each other
and connected in time and place that they consti-
tute a single transaction; and
"(iii) each occurred within five years after a
previous act of illicit activity that is part of such
pattern.
"(5)(A) The Court may award in a civil action under this
subsection, upon a motion promptly made by a prevailing plain-
tiff, simple interest on the actual damages for the period begin-
ning on the date of service of such plaintiff's complaint alleging
a cause of action under this subsection and ending on the date
of judgment, or for any shorter period therein, if the court
finds that such award is just in the circumstances.
"(B) In determining whether such award is just in the cir-
cumstances, the court shall consider only whether in the course
of the action such plaintiff or the opposing party, or a represen-
tative of either-
"(i) made motions or asserted claims or defenses so
lacking in merit as to show that such party or representa-
tive acted intentionally for delay, or otherwise acted in bad
faith;
"(ii) violated any applicable statute, rule, or court or-
der providing for sanctions for dilatory behavior or other-
wise providing for expeditious proceedings; and
"(iii) engaged in conduct primarily for the purpose of
delaying the litigation or increasing the cost thereof.
"(6) The United States district courts shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction of civil actions under this subsection."
SEC. 6. SECTION 1968 AMENDMENT.
Section 1968 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in subsection (a), by striking out "a racketeering
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investigation" and inserting "an illicit activity investiga-
tion" in lieu thereof;
(2) in subsection (b), by striking out "racketeering"
each place it appears and inserting "illicit activity" in lieu
thereof;
(3) in subsection (c), by striking out "racketeering"
each place it appears and inserting "illicit activity" in lieu
thereof; and
(4) in subsection (f)-
(A) by striking out "racketeering" the first and
fifth place it appears and inserting "criminal" in lieu
thereof; and
(B) by striking out "racketeering" each other
place it appears and inserting "illicit activity" in lieu
thereof.
SEC. 7. EFFECTIVE DATE.
The amendments made by this Act shall not apply to any
civil action pending on the date of the enactment of this Act
that was commenced 30 days or more before such date.
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99th Congress, 2d Session: H.R. 5445
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AUGUST 15, 1986
Mr. BOUCHER (for himself, Mr. Bryant, Mr. Gekas, Mr. Coble,
and Mr. Swindall) introduced the following bill;
which was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary.
A Bill
To amend chapter 96 of title 18, United States Code.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. CHAPTER 96 HEADING AMENDMENT.
The heading for chapter 96 of title 18, United States Code,
is amended by striking out "RACKETEER INFLUENCED
AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS" and inserting in lieu
thereof "PATTERN OF ILLICIT ACTIVITY".
SEC. 2. SECTION 1961 AMENDMENTS.
Section 1961 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking out "racketeering"
the first place it appears and inserting "illicit" in lieu
thereof;
(2) in paragraph (5), by striking out "racketeering"
each place it appears and inserting "illicit" in lieu thereof;
(3) in paragraph (7), by striking out "racketeering"
each place it appears and inserting "criminal" in lieu
thereof; and
(4) in paragraph (8)-
(A) by striking out "racketeering" the first place
it appears and inserting "illicit activity" in lieu thereof;
and
(B) by striking out "racketeering" the second
place it appears and inserting "criminal" in lieu
thereof.
SEC. 3. SECTION 1962 AMENDMENTS.
Section 1962 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
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striking out "racketeering" each place it appears and inserting
"illicit" in lieu thereof.
SEC. 4 SECTION 1963 AMENDMENT.
Paragraph (3) of section 1963(a) of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by striking out "racketeering" and inserting
"illicit" in lieu thereof.
SEC. 5. SECTION 1964 AMENDMENT.
Subsection (c) of section 1964 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows:
"(c)(1) Any person whose business or property is injured
by conduct in violation of section 1962 of this title may in a civil
action against a person who knowingly engaged in such conduct
recover the actual damages that the person whose business or
property was injured sustained by reason of such injury.
"(2) If the business or property of the United States or a
State, including any department, agency, or government corpo-
ration of the United States or a State, is injured by conduct in
violation of section 1962 of this title, the Attorney General of
the United States or the chief legal officer of such State, as the
case may be, may in a civil action against a person who know-
ingly engaged in such conduct recover threefold the actual
damages that the government sustained by reason of such
injury.
"(3) A person other than an individual is liable under this
subsection for the conduct of another to the extent that the
conduct complained of is-
"(A) knowingly engaged in by an officer, director,
partner, or employee of such person, acting as such officer,
director, partner, or employee;
"(B) authorized or ratified by-
"(i) an executive officer; or
"(ii) the governing board;
possessing the authority to determine the manner in
which such person conducts its essential functions; and
"(C) intended to benefit, and did benefit, such person
materially.
"(4) An action under this subsection must be commenced
not later than three years after the plaintiff first knew or
should have known of the existence of conduct giving rise to
the cause of action under this subsection.
1987]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
"(5) In an action under this subsection alleging illicit ac-
tivity based on fraud, the plaintiff must establish the existence
of that fraud by clear and convincing evidence.
"(6) In an action under this subsection the court shall
award a prevailing plaintiff a reasonable attorney's fee.".
SEC. 6. SECTION 1968 AMENDMENT.
Section 1968 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in subsection (a), by striking out "a racketeering
investigation" and inserting "an illicit activity investiga-
tion" in lieu thereof;
(2) in subsection (b), by striking out "racketeering"
each place it appears and inserting "illicit activity" in lieu
thereof;
(3) in subsection (c), by striking out "racketeering"
each place it appears and inserting "illicit activity" in lieu
thereof; and
(4) in subsection (f)-
(A) by striking out "racketeering" the first and
fifth place it appears and inserting "criminal" in lieu
thereof; and
(B) by striking out "racketeering" each other
place it appears and inserting "illicit activity" in lieu
thereof.
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99th Congress, 2d Session: H.R. 5445
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER 9 (legislative day, OCTOBER 6), 1986
Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary
An Act
To amend chapter 96 of title 18, United States Code.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. PATTERN OF ILLICIT ACTIVITY.
(a) CHAPTER 96 HEADING.-The heading for chapter 96 of
title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking out
"RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZA-
TIONS" and inserting in lieu thereof "PATTERN OF ILLICIT
ACTIVITY".
(b) SECTION 1961.-Section 1961 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended-
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking out "racketeering"
the first place it appears and inserting "illicit" in lieu
thereof;
(2) in paragraph (5), by striking out "racketeering"
each place it appears and inserting "illicit" in lieu thereof;
(3) in paragraph (7), by striking out "racketeering"
each place it appears and inserting "criminal" in lieu
thereof; and
(4) in paragraph (8)-
(A) by striking out "racketeering" the first place
it appears and inserting "illicit activity" in lieu thereof;
and
(B) by striking out "racketeering" the second
place it appears and inserting "criminal" in lieu
thereof.
(c) SECTION 1962.-Section 1962 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by striking out "racketeering" each place it
appears and inserting "illicit" in lieu thereof.
(d) SECTION 1963.-Paragraph (3) of section 1963(a) of ti-
tle 18, United States Code, is amended by striking out "racke-
teering" and inserting "illicit" in lieu thereof.
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(e) SECTION 1968.-Section 1968 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended-
(1) in subsection (a), by striking out "a racketeering
investigation" and inserting "an illicit activity investiga-
tion" in lieu thereof;
(2) in subsection (b), by striking out "racketeering"
each place it appears and inserting "illicit activity" in lieu
thereof;
(3) in subsection (c), by striking out "racketeering"
each place it appears and inserting "illicit activity" in lieu
thereof; and
(4) in subsection (f)-
(A) by striking out "racketeering" the first, sec-
ond, and fifth places it appears and inserting "crimi-
nal" in lieu thereof;
(B) by striking out "racketeering" each other
place it appears and inserting "illicit activity" in lieu
thereof; and
(C) by striking out "racketeer" and inserting "il-
licit activity" in lieu thereof.
SEC. 2. CIVIL RECOVERY.
Subsection (c) of section 1964 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows:
"(c)(1)(A) A governmental entity whose business or
property is injured by conduct in violation of section 1962
of this title may bring, in any appropriate United States
district court, a civil action against the person who engaged
in such conduct and shall recover threefold the actual dam-
ages that the governmental entity sustained by reason of
such injury, and the costs of the civil action, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
"(B) A civil action under subparagraph (A) of
this paragraph must be brought by-
"(i) the Attorney General, if the injury is to
the business or property of a governmental entity
of the United States;
"(ii) the chief legal officer of the State, if the
injury is to the business or property of a govern-
mental entity of the State; or
"(iii) the chief legal officer of a subdivision
of a State, if the injury is to the business or prop-
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erty of the subdivision and if such officer is specifi-
cally authorized by statute of that State to bring
actions under this subsection.
"(2) A person, other than a governmental entity,
whose business or property is injured by conduct in viola-
tion of section 1962 of this title may bring, in any appropri-
ate United States district court, a civil action against the
person who engaged in the conduct and shall recover-
"(A) threefold the actual damages that such per-
son whose property or business is injured sustained by
reason of such injury, and the costs of the civil action,
including a reasonable attorney's fee, if the person who
engaged in the conduct was, with respect to such con-
duct, convicted of an illicit activity or of a violation of
section 1962 of this title; or
"(B)(i) the actual damages that such person
whose property or business is injured sustained by rea-
son of such injury, and the costs of the civil action in-
cluding a reasonable attorney's fee, and
"(ii) punitive damages of up to twice the actual
damages, if-
"(I) the person whose business or property is
injured is a natural person and the injury occurred
in connection with a purchase or lease, for per-
sonal or household use or investment, of a product,
service, investment, or other property; or a con-
tract for personal or household use or investment;
"(II) neither State nor Federal securities
laws make available an express or implied remedy
for the type of behavior on which the claim of the
plaintiff is based; and
"(III) the defendant acted in wanton disre-
gard of plaintiff's rights (but conduct of the de-
fendant in good faith and in reliance upon a
directly applicable regulatory action, approval, or
interpretation of law by an authorized State
agency is not in wanton disregard of plaintiff's
rights for the purposes of this subclause).
"(3) In a civil action involving a claim for punitive
damages under paragraph (2)(B) of this subsection, the
trier of fact, in determining the amount of punitive dam-
ages, shall consider-
"(A) the degree of culpability of the defendant;
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"(B) the degree of disparity in the bargaining po-
sitions of the plaintiff and the defendant;
"(C) any history of similar conduct by the
defendant;
"(D) the benefits derived from the unlawful con-
duct by the defendant;
"(E) the number of persons victimized;
"(F) any prior decision by a court or State or
Federal agency as to whether the defendant violated
applicable law or acted in bad faith; and
"(G) any other factor the court deems to be an
equitable consideration bearing on the appropriate
amount of punitive damages.
"(4) For a civil action under paragraph (2) of this sub-
section seeking damages under subparagraph (B) of such
paragraph (2), the term 'pattern of illicit activity' requires
at least two acts of illicit activity-
"(A) one of which occurred not more than five
years after the prior act of illicit activity;
"(B) that are not so closely related in time and
place that together the acts constitute a single episode;
and
"(C) (for actions based on a violation of section
1962(c) of this title) each of which is related to the af-
fairs of the enterprise.
"(5)(A) A civil action under this subsection may not
be commenced after the latest of-
"(i) three years after the date the cause of
action accrues;
"(ii) three years after the conduct causing in-
jury to the plaintiff terminates; or
"(iii) two years after the date of the criminal
conviction required for an action under paragraph
(2)(A) of this subsection.
"(B) The period of limitation provided in subpar-
agraph (A) of this paragraph on a cause of action does
not run during the pendency of a government civil ac-
tion or criminal case relating to the conduct upon
which such cause of action is based.
"(6) As used in this subsection, the term 'governmen-
tal entity' means the United States or a State, and includes
any department, agency, or government corporation of the
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United States or a State, any political subdivision of a
State, and any enterprise for which a trustee has been ap-
pointed by a United States district court under section
1964(a) of this title (but only during the tenure of such
trustee).".
SEC. 3. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
AMENDMENTS.
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
amended-
(1) in the caption, by inserting ", and Suits under 18
U.S.C. 1964(c)" after "Mind"; and
(2) by inserting after the first sentence the following:
"In an action under 18 U.S.C. 1964(c), facts supporting the
claim against each defendant shall be averred with
particularity.".
SEC. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE.
(a) GENERAL RULE.-The amendments made by this Act
shall apply to any civil action commenced after the date of
enactment.
(b) EXCEPTION.-In any pending action under section
1964(c) of title 18, United States Code, in which a person would
be eligible to recover only under paragraph (2)(B)(i) of section
1964(c) as amended by this Act, if this Act had been enacted
before the commencement of that action, the recovery of that
person shall be limited to the recovery provided under such
paragraph (2)(B)(i), unless in the pending action-
(1) there has been a jury verdict or district court
judgment, establishing the defendant's liability, or settle-
ment has occurred; or
(2) the court determines that, in light of all the cir-
cumstances, such limitation of recovery would be clearly
unjust.
Passed the House of Representatives October 7, 1986.
Attest: BENJAMIN J. GUTHRIE,
C/erk.
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